Are citizens becoming more critical? A comparative study of political trust LA and Europe

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Major factors explaining political trust (individual and cross-national differences

There are two major paradigms to explain political trust and its trends:

A) Culturalists argument (Inglehart 1990; Hooghe & Zmerli 2011). Exogenous to the political process and its output.

B) Based on performance and expectations (differences) (Hetherington & Rudolph 2008; Norris 2011). Endogenous to the political process and its outputs.

The critical citizens argument (Norris 1999; Norris 2011) belongs to this second group since it is a **performance evaluation argument**, defending the growing impact of performance on political trust.

The performance detate

❑The recent crisis is Europe has produced an increasing number of papers emphasizing the role of the performance to explain the deterioration of political trust (Kenworthy & Owens, 2011; van de Meer & Dekker, 2011; Meer & Hakhverdian, 2016).

❑But, the performance argument has also two different positions:

1. Pure instrumental economic argument (Polavieja 2011; Erkel & Meer, 2015).
2. Political process argument (Norris 2011; Torcal 2014; Meer & Hakhverdian, 2016; Torcal 2017).

❑Question 1: What of the two are more important in general?
❑Question 2: what are the most important due to the 2008 crisis?

The economic performance debate

Even here there is some debates:

❑   Real effect of objective indicators?
>   1. Yes (Anderson 2009; Cusack, 1999; Kotzian 2011; Mishler & Rose 2001; Taylor 2000).
>   2. No (Dahlberg & Holmberg 2014; Dalton 2004; Hackverdian & Mayne 2012; Oskarsson 2010; van de Meer 2010).

❑   Which factors? Inflation, Unemployment or Gross Dometic Product (Clarke et al. 1993; Miller & Listhaug 1999; van de Meer & Hakhverdian, 2015).
❑   Absence of longitudinal effect evidence and only for all Europe (Erkel & Meer, 2015).

❑ Question 3: Effect of objective economic indicators beyond the European debate (Erkel & Meer, 2015)? Which ones are relevant?

❑ Question 4: Longitudinal effects due to the 2008 crisis?

What about the evaluation of the political process?

Evaluation of the political process is also very relevant (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2001; Rudolph 2003; Torcal 2014; Torcal 2017).
When we include (corruption), economic factors effect disappered (van der Meer & Hakhverdian 2016)?

So, the questions are:

❑What are the most important factors explaining the cross-national differences and evolution of political trust over time?

❑Which of the two performing arguments seems to be more relevant?

❑Do we see a time trend in the relative weight of these factors in explaining political trust?

❑Is this consistent across regions of the word?

❑It is something distinctive in countries suffering an important economic crisis?

❑Data from Eurobarometer (EUB) and Latinobarometer (LB) since 1998.

❑Three dependent variable (political trust: parliament, political parties, government).

❑However, they are measured a little different:

   a)   EUB is a dummy: to trust it or tend not to trust it.

   b)   LB employed the following four-point response item: a lot, some, a little or no confidence?"

Dataset II

❏ Threaten the possibility to pool together the European and Latin-American data.

❏ The 2-point response format leads to higher levels of aggregate trust than would a 4-point measure.

❏ We can test this problem by using the European Values Survey (EVS) for the set of countries in which both surveys were applied in the same country during the period between 2005 and 2009.

Dataset III: correlation between the two mesures of trust in Europe

If both data sources (EVS and Eurobarometer) scale similarly we would expect in a regression that:

    a) Intercept should be equal or close to zero,

    b) beta coefficient of EVS trust should approximate to one.

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	Parliament	Parties	Government	Judiciary
(Intercept)	**0.03**	**0.04**	**0.05**[*]	**0.00**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Trust Parliament EVS	**0.98**[***]			
	(0.09)			
Trust Parties EVS		**0.85**[***]		
		(0.12)		
Trust Government EVS			**0.94**[***]	
			(0.08)	
Trust Judiciary EVS				**0.96**[***]
				(0.08)
R^2	0.73	0.51	0.76	0.78
Adj. R^2	0.72	0.50	0.76	0.77
Num. obs.	50	50	50	41
RMSE	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.08

Dataset V: Multiple imputation I

❑For interest in politics (48% missing) AND Gini Index (10% missing).

❑We employed multiple imputation using a multivariate fully conditional specification implemented by the MICE algorithm (van Buuren et al. 2011).

❑This algorithm consists in filling in multivariate missing data points based on the posterior predictive distribution of the observed data.

We multiply imputed aggregate political interest and the Gini index based on the following two-level hierarchical random coefficient models:

$$PE_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Year_{ij} + \beta_2 Trust\ Parties_{ij} + \beta_3 Corruption_{ij} + \beta_4 GDPperCapita_{ij}$$
$$+ \beta_5 Inflation_{ij} + \beta_6 Unemployment_{ij} + \beta_7 Gini_{ij} + \mu_{0j} + \mu_{1j} Year_i$$

$$Gini_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Year_{ij} + \beta_2 Trust\ Parties_{ij} + \beta_3 Corruption_{ij} + \beta_4 GDPperCapita_{ij}$$
$$+ \beta_5 Inflation_{ij} + \beta_6 Unemployment_{ij} + \beta_7 PE_{ij} + \mu_{0j} + \mu_{1j} Year_{ij}$$

Dataset VII: Multiple imputation III

❑where *i* indexes country, *j* indexes survey years, and μ_{0j} and μ_{1j} are country-level random effects associated to the intercept and *Year* variables, respectively.

❑All imputations models include as predictors several macro political and economic variables, as well as the percent of each sample that trusts political parties given that this last variable was highly predictive of the missing variables, particularly of political interest.

❑**We have produced 20 different imputations of these variables with this model. Models are estimating using these 20 different imputations.**

Dataset VIII: FINAL DATASET

Time-Series Cross-Sectional (TSCS) cross-nested panel dataset with:

❑41 countries.

❑Time series since 2002 to 2014 (we have data from before, but too much missing information in some variables).

❑Total N: 487 units of analysis (occasions) out of a total of 512 country-years (some missing data on political trust remain).

Dataset IX: time trends by countries

Dataset X: Null models by regions

	Parliament	Parties	Government
(Intercept)	0.3656***	0.1936***	0.3530***
	(0.0329)	(0.0176)	(0.0257)
Sigma_{Obs}	0.0852	0.0498	0.0866
Sigma_{Country}	0.1440	0.0817	0.1073
Sigma_{Year}	0.0455	0.0128	0.0418
N obs	297	297	297
N countries	23	23	23
N years	13	13	13

***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Anova Linear Cross Classified Random Effect Models of Political Trust - European Countries

	Parliament	Parties	Government
(Intercept)	0.2756***	0.1978***	0.3756***
	(0.0232)	(0.0176)	(0.0265)
Sigma_{Obs}	0.0719	0.0494	0.1117
Sigma_{Country}	0.0774	0.0594	0.0737
Sigma_{Year}	0.0463	0.0351	0.0633
N obs	190	190	190
N countries	18	18	18
N years	13	13	13

***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Anova Linear Cross Classified Random Effect Models of Political Trust - Latin American Countries

Dataset XI: What varies more??

❑ In general there is:

1. More cross-national variation that time variation.
2. Occasion (year-country variation is more important that time.
3. No clear time evolution.

❑ By regions:

1. More country variation in Europe.
2. Greater relative importance of time variation in LA, despite of the Economic crisis in Europe

Fundamental Independent Variables

❑Corruption: Perceptions Index by Transparency International (higher, less corruption).

❑Political interest: Proxy for cultural factors (Prior 2010): very stable and mostly depending on political socialization.

❑Economic performance: unemployment, inflation and GNP growth.

❑Social performance: Gini index.

❑Institutional controlling variable: ENEP

Specification of the model

❏ To capture the effect on y_{ij} of variation over time within each country, x_{ij} can then be subtracted from $\bar{x}_j$. The resulting longitudinal component x_{ijM} (a country-year level variable) is **group-mean** centred, and is **orthogonal to $\bar{x}_j$, such that the two coefficients can be estimated separately**. This leads to the following 'within-between' random effects model:

$$y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{ij1} + \beta_2 \bar{x}_{j1} + \beta_3 x_{ij2} + \beta_5 \bar{x}_{j2} + \beta_3 x_{ij3} + \beta_5 \bar{x}_{j3} + ... + \mu_i + \mu_j + e_{ij}$$

where the original time-varying variable x_{ijM} and the country-varying variable $\bar{x}_{jM}$ **are included twice in the model**. A benefit of this approach is that the 'within' coefficients will return the same results as in an FE model.

❏ **Two variables: time variable (within) and cross-national variable (between).**

Results General model

	Parliament	Parties	Government
(Intercept)	-0.176 (0.151)	-0.138 (0.102)	-0.145 (0.160)
Time variables (within)			
Corruption	0.005 (0.009)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.012)
ENP	-0.000 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.005)
Inflation rate	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)*
Gini index	-0.005 (0.002)**	-0.003 (0.002)*	-0.012 (0.003)***
Unemployment rate	-0.015 (0.001)***	-0.008 (0.001)***	-0.014 (0.002)***
Growth rate	0.006 (0.001)***	0.003 (0.001)***	0.006 (0.002)***
Political interest	0.178 (0.076)**	0.163 (0.048)***	0.116 (0.098)
Cross-national variables (between)			
Corruption	0.045 (0.011)***	0.023 (0.007)***	0.041 (0.011)***
ENP	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.004 (0.008)
Inflation rate	0.011 (0.004)***	0.009 (0.003)***	0.011 (0.004)***
Gini index	0.004 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)*	0.005 (0.003)*
Unemployment rate	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.000 (0.005)
Growth rate	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.011)
Political interest	0.344 (0.182)*	0.248 (0.123)**	0.111 (0.193)
Sigma_{Obs}	0.069	0.044	0.090
Sigma_{Country}	0.075	0.051	0.077
Sigma_{Year}	0.026	0.017	0.023
N obs	487	487	487
N countries	41	41	41
N years	13	13	13

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table: Main Effects Linear Cross-Classified Random Effect Models of Political Trust

First General Conclusions

❑Time variation:

a) Annual changes in economic performance are predominantly relevant...especially unemployment (very strong and robust).

b) Annual changes in Gini index are relevant for trust in Parties and Government.

c) Annual changes in cultural influence is somewhat relevant, but residual...it tends to be stable

❑Cross-national variation:

a) Increases in average corruption levels lead to more trust. Strong and consistent. Take into account that this index is also very stable over time (almost a time invariant factor).

b) Average inflation, but in the wrong direction...an indicator of economic growth??

Results by Regions: Regions?

Interactions with Time variables (within)			
AL * Corruption	0.046 (0.022)**	0.022 (0.014)	0.055 (0.028)*
AL * ENP	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.011)
AL * Inflation rate	-0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)
AL * Gini index	0.001 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.003)*	-0.001 (0.007)
AL * Unemployment rate	0.008 (0.004)**	0.004 (0.002)*	0.005 (0.005)
AL * Growth rate	-0.006 (0.002)***	0.001 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.003)
AL * Political interest	0.341 (0.174)*	0.272 (0.108)**	0.407 (0.209)*
Interactions with Cross-national variables (between)			
AL * Corruption	-0.032 (0.022)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.027 (0.024)
AL * ENP	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.017 (0.019)
AL * Inflation rate	-0.022 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.022 (0.020)
AL * Gini index	0.016 (0.011)	0.006 (0.007)	0.010 (0.012)
AL * Unemployment rate	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.013 (0.013)
AL * Growth rate	0.027 (0.023)	0.016 (0.015)	-0.009 (0.026)
AL * Political interest	0.612 (0.445)	0.484 (0.292)*	0.658 (0.499)
Sigma_{Obs}	0.071	0.046	0.092
Sigma_{Country}	0.068	0.045	0.075
N obs	487	487	487
N countries	41	41	41

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table: Linear Cross-Classified Random Effect Models of Political Trust with Regional Interactions

Conclusions by region

- ❑ The within (time) effect of Corruption is stronger in LA (parliament)
- ❑ The within (time) effect of Unemployment is stronger in LA (parliament and Parties)
- ❑ The within (time) effect of changes in economic growth is less positive in LA (parliament).
- ❑ The within (time) effect of changes in social inequality is less positive in LA (government)
- ❑ The effect of annual changes in pol. interest to explain political trust is higher in LA for the three institutions.

Are citizens becoming more "Critical"? The effect of time I

❑ Two empirical and theoretical questions:

1. The Critical Citizen Hypothesis: increasing role of performing factors

2. Relevant for the Great Recession in 2008 argument (Armingeon & Guthmann 2013; Braun &Tausendfund 2014; Erkel & van der Meer 2015; Kenworthy & Owens 2011; Torcal 2014; Torcal 2017)

We test this by estimating "societal growth curves" (Fairbrother 2014: 125ff) with interaction of time with a country mean variable $_j$, leading to the following model specification:

$$y_{ti} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 time_{ij} + \beta_2 x_{ijM} + \beta_{3j} + \beta_4 time_{ij* j} + \beta_4 x_j + \mu_j + e_{ij}$$

Finally, I estimate a model that adds a country-level interaction between the long term performance $_j$, which take the following form:

$$y_{ti} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 time_{ij} + \beta_2 x_{ijM} + \beta_{3j} + \beta_4 z_{ijM} + \beta_{5j +} \beta_{6j* j} + \beta_7 x_j + \mu_j + e_{ij}$$

❑If the interactive coefficient is significant and has same sign than coefficient of constituent variable, the effect of the variable is growing over time (years)

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Results for Europe: interactions Europe*time

Interactions with year

|			
Corruption (within)*Year	0.006 (0.003)**	0.005 (0.002)**	0.009 (0.003)***
Unemployment rate(within)*Year	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)
Growth rate(within)*Year	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)
Political Interest(within)*Year	-0.007 (0.027)	-0.000 (0.017)	0.002 (0.030)
Sigma_{obs}	0.055	0.035	0.063
Sigma_{Intercept_Country}	0.119	0.062	0.111
Sigma_{year1}	0.012	0.006	0.011
Sigma_{Intercept_Year1}	0.011	0.015	0.011
N obs	297	297	297
N countries	23	23	23
N years	13	13	13

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table: Linear Cross-Classified Random Effect Models of Political Trust with Within Interactions

Results for Europe: interactions Europe*time

Within Marginal Effects of Corruption by Year - EU Countries

Conclusions for Europe

❑Corruption is becoming more relevant to explain the evolution overtime of political trust in EU.

❑Absence of economic and social performing variables. They are strong, but its effect are not becoming more relevant overtime. Crisis effect???

Results for La: interactions LA*time

Interactions with year			
Corruption (within)*Year	0.006 (0.006)	0.002 (0.004)	0.000 (0.010)
Unemployment rate(within)*Year	0.002 (0.001)*	0.001 (0.001)	0.007 (0.002)***
Growth rate(within)*Year	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)
Political Interest(within)*Year	0.022 (0.036)	0.014 (0.025)	0.056 (0.058)
Sigma_{obs}	0.064	0.044	0.101
Sigma_{Intercept_Country}	0.055	0.050	0.074
Sigma_{year1}	0.005	0.005	0.010
Sigma_{Intercept_Year1}	0.038	0.017	0.019
N obs	190	190	190
N countries	18	18	18
N years	13	13	13

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table: Linear Cross-Classified Random Effect Models of Political Trust with Within Interactions – Latin American

Conclusions for LA

Very little:

The effect of annual changes in unemployment to explain time variations is becoming less important overtime (only for Parliament and more importantly for Government).

Final conclusions

❑Yes, citizens are critical, i.e., political trust is depending more on the evaluation of performance, but contrary to our expectations mostly with corruption in Europe.

❑Performance is very strong, especially unemployment, but corruption is also relevant to explain cross-national differences (corruption is an almost time-invariant variable).

Mark your calendar for RECSM Summer School 2017
June 26th –July 7th

Thank you!!!