

# **The effects of regional attachment on ideological self-placement: A comparative approach.**

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## *Abstract:*

In spite of the appeal of the left-right scale to summarize almost any new divisive issue, some contexts –such as regions with an entrenched territorial conflict with the state- pose questions regarding the relationship between the ideological spectrum and the center-periphery axis. The existing literature does not agree on whether both axes are related or not and to what extent. We contend that both axes can have a dependency relationship that goes from the latter to the former, and that individuals' ideological position will depend on contextual (regional) features such as relative wealth, and distinctiveness of the region as compared to the state. We also posit that the effects of regional attachment on ideological self-placement will depend on the aforementioned regional variables; more particularly, that territorial attachment will have a stronger effect on ideology (a preferential regional attachment predicting left-wing positions) for individuals in less wealthy or more distinctive regions. We test these expectations using the Making Electoral Democracy Work, which gathers 11 regions from 5 different countries.

## Introduction

Since Lipset and Rokkan first conceptualized cleavages as determinants of electoral competition, the literature has widely discussed how to measure them, the number of relevant dimensions and their relationship. In accordance with Lipset's modernization theory and the freezing hypothesis, the left-right axis emerged as the most pervasive political division shaping the electoral arena, parties and voters in the study of democracies (Bartolini & Mair, 2007; Benoit, Laver, & others, 2006; Budge, Robertson, & Hearl, 1987; Castles & Mair, 1984; Gerring, 1997; Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976; Knutsen, 1995). The left-right scale would be a particularly efficient heuristic able to summarize salient political divisions such as religion (versus laicism) or support for free market (versus state interventions in the economy), which would reflect its adaptive quality despite the emergence of new political conflicts (De Vries, Hakhverdian, & Lancee, 2013; Polk & Rovny, 2013).

However, there are at least three aspects challenging the unidimensionality of ideology. First, the emergence of new social divides and issues that could realign voters' electoral choices beyond citizens' self-placement in the left-right scale, limiting its encompassing capacity (G. Evans, Heath, & Lalljee, 1996; Kriesi et al., 2008; Treier & Hillygus, 2009; Valenzuela, Bargsted, & Somma, 2013). Second, the historical or institutional context, which can influence the conceptions informing individual self-placements in the left-right continuum, resulting in significant variations across regions (Polk & Rovny, 2013; Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout, 2007). Third, the existence of additional relevant cleavages of political competition, and particularly in the case of regional arenas where public opinion and party politics can be structured around a bidimensional axis, as the center-periphery cleavage has been proven to have a relevant influence on electoral competition in certain contexts (Balcells, 2007; Elias, Szöcsik, & Zuber, 2015).

Indeed, the emergence of regionalist parties, whose main goal is to defend self-government claims and push the territorial dimension into the political agenda, complexifies the relationship between the left-right scale and the center-periphery axis (Chandra, 2011; Newman, 1997). An expanding literature posits that their left-right positioning is subsumed to the center-periphery dimension; and mostly determined by the relative wellness of the region (Gomez-Reino et al. 2006; Massetti 2009; Massetti & Schakel 2015). However, these suggestive works do not tackle individual attitudes but rely on parties' features and discourses (De Winter & Tursan, 2004; Massetti & Schakel, 2016; Newman, 1997). As a result, we don't know much about whether, to what extent and under what contextual

conditions citizens construe their self-placement in the left-right as a result of their territorial identification.

This research aims at addressing these questions while exploring the dimensionality of the left-right spectrum in contexts where the center-periphery axis can be a relevant cleavage. More specifically, we want to know if these axes hold a dependent or an independent relationship and what are the contextual traits that alter the relationship between the two main axes of the electoral competition.

Our main argument is that individuals with a strong attachment to the regional level would infer a more left-wing self-placement position in the ideological scale, regardless of their actual preferences on the economic and cultural issues that the left-right axis summarizes. Moreover, this “nonconformist” spillover effect from territorial identification with the region to a particular position in the left-right axis might be modified by contextual features such as the relative wealth and distinctiveness of the region as compared to the state. Thus, following previous works on regional parties' discourse and manifestos, we expect citizens to place themselves more to the left in the ideological spectrum as a result of their territorial identification conditional to the economical and cultural features of their region.

To address these questions we focus on voters' positions in a comparative perspective. We first present descriptive evidence suggesting the possibility that ideology and territorial attachment are not independent. Second, we explore how territorial attachment affects ideology differently across regions. If national attachment exerts some significant influence over ideology, we can then explore about certain factors accounting for this influence at a regional level. In order to do so we develop a multi-level analysis based on the survey data available from the *Making Electoral Democracy Work* project, which includes data for 11 regions in 5 countries.

## **The multiple dimensions of ideology**

Ideologies are aggregates of values, opinions and preferences about issues that help individuals structuring and simplifying their political choices (Downs, 1957; Hinich & Munger, 1996). The most widespread metaphor for ideology is the left-right continuum, which was first used in the French parliament to differentiate between monarchists and republicans (Bobbio & Cameron, 1996). The parsimony and ability to effectively represent almost any social cleavage and issue position has historically placed the left-right scale as a ubiquitous variable in electoral studies. It has been proven as a strong predictor of a variety of issues such as party positioning on European integration, traditionalism, inequality, rule-following, high need for security and low need for openness to experience (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002; Thorisdottir et al., 2007). The pervasiveness of the left-right distinction would reflect its adaptive quality, even when post-material or cultural issues would increasingly inform its contents beyond the class or the economic divide (De Vries et al., 2013; Marks, Hooghe, Nelson, & Edwards, 2006). This is consistent with the perspective of the left-right continuum as the epitome of the political heuristic, this is, a shortcut “that people use to draw complicated inferences from simple environmental cues” (Kuklinski & Quirk, 2000).

Nevertheless, the emergence of some new issues and social divides put into question the ability of this scale to summarize all the possible conflicts in a unidimensional continuum (Grendstad, 2003; Kitschelt & Hellemans, 1990; Knutsen, 1995; Heath, 1986, 1986; Himmelweit, Humphreys, & Jaeger, 1985; Luttbeg & Gant, 1985; Robinson & Fleishman, 1988). Firstly, the evolution of voters’ values and preferences due to economic and social changes would have altered classical divisions underpinning the left-right axis challenging the unidimensionality of ideology. Some authors have added a libertarian-authoritarian scale to the usual left-right axis to reflect how conservative and liberal attitudes can be combined differently with economic and socio-cultural issues (G. Evans et al., 1996). Others argue against the unidimensionality of ideology exploring different configurations in economic and social issues preferences and arguing that ideology is, at least, bidimensional (Feldman & Johnston, 2014).

The multifaceted character of ideology has also been found in a comparative perspective, suggesting how the position in the left-right axis can respond to different configurations of policy preferences across countries. Particular configurations of policy preferences corresponding with individual self-placement in the left-right scale have to do

with historical and institutional elements such as the European West/East divide (Thorisdottir et al., 2007); with religious affiliations (Rovny and Polk 2013); or with particular historical divisions and regime welfare characteristics (Henjak 2010) that ultimately determine the salience of contemporary political cleavages. Spatial variations around the multidimensional configurations of ideology are also related to the relevance of the territorial cleavage within regions, which brings forth the most challenging phenomenon for the ability of the left-right spectrum to effectively organize values, attitudes and issue positions on a single dimension: the center-periphery axis.

The center-periphery axis is based on cultural, ethnical, religious or linguistic differences across sub-groups within a country (Ansell & Lindvall, 2013; Rokkan, Flora, Kuhnle, & Urwin, 1999). Minority nationalisms are particularly challenging for the unidimensionality of the ideological cleavage, since when a population is divided across the center-periphery axis parties also reproduce and reinforce this cleavage, resulting in a new dimension of competition. This has important implications depending on how individuals' self-placement in the ideological and the territorial axis follow a cross-cutting or an overlapping pattern (J. Evans & Tonge, 2009; Mendelsohn, 2002). The relation between two relevant cleavages can be conceived as a continuum from total independence to total dependence in statistical terms. When both cleavages are independent there is a situation of perfect cross-cuttingness, and therefore one's position in one of the competition axis does not affect the position on the other scale (Selway, 2011, p. 119). Conversely, overlapping cleavages would imply that they are strongly associated to and even influenced by each other. A possibility explored by some works is that regional parties subsume their ideological position into the territorial cleavage (Masseti, 2009; Massetti & Schakel, 2015), but there is much less evidence on how individuals develop their position in both axis.

Recent studies on minority nationalisms such as Catalonia, Quebec or the Basque Country discuss the relationship between these two main axes –ideology and national identity; or the left-right scale and the center-periphery axis-. Some of these works suggest that citizens' perceptions are better captured increasing the complexity of this spatial representation of preferences (Medeiros, Gauvin, & Chhim, 2015), while other question that the left-right scale and national identity are truly orthogonal (Dinas, 2012; Liñeira, Muñoz, & Rico, s.d.). We go one step further putting to empirical test the multidimensionality of citizens' self-placement along the classic cleavages instead of the usual focus on party competition. Some case-studies show evidence of how nationalist voters place themselves more to the left compared to state-wide parties' voters, but the question of possible

mechanisms underpinning this relation has not been addressed, let alone a comparative analysis exploring the existence of regional variations (Strijbis & Leonisio, 2012). The present work takes the challenge to test, from an individual and a comparative perspective, whether, to what extent and under what contextual conditions an individual with a particular position in the center-periphery axis is more likely to adopt a particular position in the ideological continuum.

### **Why the center-periphery axis would predict ideology.**

Previous works on parties and cleavages suggest that the center-periphery axis can affect the left-right axis, particularly in regions where the territorial cleavage is prominent, and in different ways depending on the distinctive characteristics of the region as compared to the nation.

A first reason to expect that individuals' position in the center-periphery axis affects their self-placement in the left-right scale is based on the nature of both attitudinal dimensions. Individuals internalize collective identities by means of primary socialization processes which generate constitutive norms on particular values that are present in everyday life, leading them to favour members of their own group even beyond their own material interests (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, & McDermott, 2009, p. 21; Billig, 1995; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Indeed, political psychology has described identification with the community as one of the first early-formed attitudes that underpins political attitudes (Ehman, 1980; Van Deth, Abendschön, & Vollmar, 2011). Its symbolical and normative content is integrated to the individual's political personality early in life and serve as a basis for the development of other attitudes.

Moreover, the identification with a community can be regarded as a core value or belief, a cornerstone of a society's political culture that individuals adopt from the presence of a consensus about how government and society should function (Bem, 1970; Devine, 1972; Feldman, 1988; McClosky & Zaller, 1984). Attachment to one's political community can be regarded as an early-formed believe and as an antecedent of more sophisticated and complex attitudinal dimensions. It has indeed been found to be more successful transmitted from parents to children than parents' identification with the left-right scale (Rico and Jennings 2016). Thus, we contend that territorial attachment precedes ideological self-placement, this last being the result of a myriad of values, issues, cleavages and opinions

that to a relevant extent are only learned or affirmed in later stages of the socialization process.

On the other hand, there is an extensive literature about the relationship between Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) that can help explain a particular configuration of ideological orientations in regions where the center-periphery cleavage is salient. Duckitt & Sibley, for instance, found that both right-wing ideological dimensions (RWA/SDO) were related with attitudes against dissident groups (2007). By the same token, we can derive that sympathy towards dissident groups, such as protestors, (particularly if the individual identifies with this dissident groups as his or her primary ingroup) will lead to identification with positions contrary to both RWA and SDO, this is, with the left-wing spectrum. In sum, a strong territorial identification with a region with an entrenched territorial conflict with the state should predict left-wing orientations.

Classical theories in ethnic studies such as Horowitz (1981) or Hechter (1992) expected secessionist tensions to arise among disadvantaged groups in underdeveloped or weak states. However, these tensions can also emerge in economically advanced but politically weak regions, especially when there are high levels of financial transfers to poorer regions (Gourevitch, 1979, p. 311; Siroky, Mueller, & Hechter, 2014, p. 49; Sorens, 2009, p. 310). In a recent work on redistribution preferences within Spain, Balcells et al. (2015) find evidence of a positive correlation between being a subsidized region and favouring redistribution. Hence, regional territorial attachment towards a disadvantaged region should predict left-wing self-placement.

These findings are in accordance with the identity approach found in the economic literature in the sense that redistribution preferences are higher towards in-group members over out-groups, and in contexts with a relevant center-periphery cleavage this can affect how individuals shape their policy preferences, which are mediated by support for the status quo or self-government (Alesina, Spolaore, & Wacziarg, 2005, p. 8). According to this research stream, ethnically fragmented countries tend to suffer more inequality and have less economical success (Alesina & Ferrara, 2005; Easterly & Levine, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999). From this perspective, we can expect that the more differentiated from the rest of the state a region is, the more this can affect their preferences regarding self-government and their relationships with the left-right scale. In highly differentiated regions (as compared to the state), individuals identifying more with their

region would tend to place themselves more to the left of the ideological spectrum, as an expression of their preference for a change in the status quo.

Finally, the relational context between the different polities can affect how territorial attachment affects the ideological axis. As stated before, citizens with a strong territorial attachment to a region with contentious relationships with the state will have a critical stance towards the status quo. If the status quo is one in which there are few transferences from rich to poor regions and the contentious region is a disadvantaged, very differentiated one, support for more self-government can lead individuals to place themselves more to the left than they would if the territorial question were absent or the region were richer. If confirmed, this would add on previous findings about regionalist parties in poor regions identifying with the left, while in wealthy regions they are more neo-liberal (Masseti & Schakel, 2015, p. 868).

Our aim is to test these expectations from an individual perspective. In the process, we will address the matter of the multidimensionality of ideology and the moderating effects of contextual factors such as the relative wealth and distinctiveness of the region for the effects of regional attachment on ideological self-placement. Our hypotheses can be summarized as follows:

H1) there is a dependence relationship between an individual's positions in the center-periphery axis and his/her self-placement in the left-right scale. The stronger the individual's alignment with the region/periphery (as compared to the state/center), the more he will place himself to the left-wing side of the spectrum.

H2) Disadvantaged regions (as compared to the state) will breed more left-wing citizens.

H3) In more culturally distinct regions (as compared to the state) individuals will tend to place themselves more to the left of the ideological spectrum.

H4) Individuals in less wealthy or more distinctive regions will experience stronger links between the left-right and the center-periphery axis, in the sense that the stronger the attachment to the region, the more leftist the individual.



## **Research Design, data and models.**

In order to shed some light on the relationship between the left-right and the ethno-regionalist scales we will use the Making Electoral Democracy Work surveys (Blais 2010). The project includes questionnaires corresponding with 27 elections (European, national and sub-national). The samples are representative of 11 regions (Lucerne, Zurich, Provence, Île-de-France, Madrid, Catalonia, Québec, British Columbia, Ontario, Lower Saxony, Bavaria) within five countries (Switzerland, France, Spain, Canada and Germany). The surveys are online quota-bases, each one including a campaign and a post-election survey conducted between 2011 and 2015. This paper only uses campaign surveys, which contains all the relevant information.

In each election survey respondents were asked to locate themselves on a left-right scale, ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). Four more questions followed, asking participants to place themselves in similar scales. The first one tapped on preferences regarding taxes; its minimum indicating that reducing taxes was preferable than improving services; its maximum showing a preference for improving services even at the expense of increasing taxes. The next scale gauges preferences regarding redistribution, its minimum pointing at maximum preference for redistribution. Another scale refers to the authoritarian/libertarian axis, and opposes preferences for rehabilitation programs to preferences for tough sentences; the last option pointing at authoritarian positions. The last scale asks the individual to place himself on a scale where the minimum indicates being favorable to having more immigrants and the maximum express a desire to having fewer immigrants.

As for our main explanatory factor; the territorial dimension, we will operationalize it using two attachment scales going from 0 (minimum attachment) to 10 (maximum attachment); one for the region and one for the nation. Previous studies show that classic alternatives such as the Linz-Moreno question overestimates dual identities (Guinjoan and Rodon 2015) and that the subtraction of the regional and national attachment avoids this downside (Galais and Blais 2015), the resulting scale being interpretable in terms of the “neat” national attachment. Hence, we have created a differential attachment scale that taps the difference between the national and the regional territorial attachment subtracting the regional identification from the national one. Then, we have recoded the result (ranging from -10 to +10) so as to range between 0 and 1. Lower values indicate that the individual is more attached to the regional level than to the national territorial community; while values

closer to 1 indicate that the individual is much more attached to the national level of government than to the region.

As for the variables aimed to tap the contextual factors that we contend that affect the self-placement in the left-right scale and explain the strength of the relationship between the left-right scale and the nationalism axis, we have selected the following five indicators. Two economic indicators tap, respectively, equality and wealth of the regions. The **Gini index after taxes** indicates the level of equality of a Region once all taxes are paid, hence after the Region's and the state's redistributive action. A value of the Gini coefficient close to 1 indicates maximal inequality within the region. As for wealth, we have chosen the **Region's GDP per capita** in 2013 –a year place in the middle of the fieldwork of the MEDW study- in relation with the state and taking 100 as a basis. Values lower than 1 indicate that the region is poorer than the nation; while values higher than 1 indicate how many times the region is richer than the nation.

Three more variables tap on the cultural distinctiveness of the Region as compared to the Nation. First, we have computed the index of **linguistic fractionalization** for each region based on available data. This index takes the value of the percentage of speakers of the distinctive regional language. Next, we consider a measure of **territorial polarization** or, more precisely, the ideological distance of the region as compared to the state. We have computed it taking the countries' average in the left-right scale using the last wave of the European Social Survey, plus the 2015 Canadian Election Study. Then, we have subtracted this national average from the regional average. Positive values indicate that the region is placed to the right of the national average, and negative values identify those regions that are to the left of the national average. A last variable taps on the **depth of the ethno-regional cleavage** in every region with a proxy of polarization computed after the regional standard deviation of our differential territorial attachment scale. Higher values indicate that the population is dispersed on this respect -hence, polarized about the national/regional cleavage- while lower values indicate that citizens are pretty close to the mean value of this variable, and therefore the territorial conflict is not that entrenched.

Our analyses section proceeds as follows. We will first use the scales for issues and values, as well as the left-right and the ethno-regionalist axis to explore the dimensionality of ideology in each region. Next, self-placement in the left-right scale is estimated by means of a series of multivariate analyses. The format of our dependent variable requires a linear estimation to test the relationship between the aforementioned variables and the left-right

scale. Given that some of our hypotheses concern both individual-level and region-level variables we have adopted a multilevel approach. This strategy avoids that the structure of the errors reproduces similarities within regions, underestimating the standard errors of the macro-level variables. Hence, a series of hierarchical linear estimations are employed in order to introduce region-level variables as both predictors of the self-placement in the left-right scale (H2 & H3) and moderators of the effect of nationalism on the left-right scale (H4). The estimations include all the scales used to explore the multidimensionality of ideology as well as age, sex and education as controls.

## Results

Table 1 shows the results of a series of exploratory factor analyses for all the variables expected to tap the left-right and the center-periphery axis. The goal is to see to what extent they arrange into a unidimensional or a multidimensional scenario; as the first situation would point to likely interdependence between both axes. The analyses are replicated for each one of the 11 regions considered in the MEDW study. We see that both Swiss regions and Provence follow the same pattern: the left-right scale and the economic and social issues usually associated to the left-right divide tap on the same dimension; but the indicator for territorial attachment loads on a different factor. In Ontario and Lower-Saxony, territorial attachment is the leading item of a second factor, along with views regarding redistribution (curiously enough, in different directions in each one of these regions).

A couple of regions present specificities regarding the left-right questions. Île-de-France, for instance, seems to construe the left-right scale more in socio-moral terms; while economic questions (redistribution, taxes and services) seem to load in a different factor. To a minor extent, a similar situation is observed in Madrid, Bavaria or British Columbia, where redistribution seems to belong to a different species and the indicator for the center-periphery axis does not reach loadings high enough to be included in any of the two resulting factors. Finally, Catalonia and Québec present distinctive patterns: in both cases, the territorial attachment indicator loads in the same dimension than the left-right scale and most of the questions related to it. The second resulting factor seems to be provoked by the inclusion of redistribution considerations. However, due to the exploratory nature of these analyses, we can't be completely sure

that these covariation patterns point to a unidimensionality scenario in Québec and Catalonia or to a strong dependency relationship, consistent with a situation of reinforcing cleavages where individuals' orientations in one axis almost perfectly predict his or her placement in the other axis.

**Table 1. Exploratory factor analyses. Indicators for the left-right and the center-periphery axes.**


	Lucerne		Zurich		IDF		Provence		Catalonia		Madrid	
	F1	F2	F1	F2	F1	F2	F1	F2	F1	F2	F1	F2
<b>Left-right scale</b>	-.76		-.81		.76		.76		.67	.47	.75	
<b>Reduce taxes-improve services</b>	.63		.67		-.46	.66	-.52	.47	-.48		-.52	
<b>For/against redistribution</b>	.47		.59		.59	.57	.53	.54	.40	.61	.56	.65
<b>Rehab/tougher sentences</b>	.75		.75		-.70	.40	-.74		-.65	.48	-.63	.51
<b>More / Less immigrants</b>	.78		.78		.77		.78		.64		.65	
<b>Territorial attachment (Nat-Reg)</b>		.87		.91				.71	.41			
	LowSax		Bavaria		Ontario		Quebec		BC			
	F1	F2	F1	F2	F1	F2	F1	F2	F1	F2		
<b>Left-right scale</b>	-.56		-.56		.70		.68		.68	.46		
<b>Reduce taxes-improve services</b>	.57		.52		-.69		-.53		-.65			
<b>For/against redistribution</b>		-.64		.82	.50	.61	.42	.67	.46	.75		
<b>Rehab/tougher sentences</b>	.74		.73		-.74		-.68	.45	-.70	.44		
<b>More / Less immigrants</b>	-.71		-.70	.40	.62	-.41	.55	-.43	.68			
<b>Territorial attachment (Nat-Reg)</b>		.64				.63	.48	.42				

Factor loadings under .4 have been omitted.

Figure 1 explores more in detail the relationship between some of the issues most commonly related to the left-right scale and self-placement in the ideological axis. The two regions exhibiting more distinctive patterns in the factor analyses above have been separated from the rest. Note that Quebec, and particularly Catalonia, follow a different pattern than the rest of the regions. Catalans tend to place themselves more to the left than citizens from other regions regardless of their opinions on any of these issues. We see several paradoxical scenarios in which individuals with clearly liberal or reactionary values (reducing taxes, tougher sentences must be put in place, we need fewer immigration) place themselves

significantly more to the left than the rest of the sample.<sup>1</sup> Multivariate and multilevel analysis can shed light on the apparent nuanced relation between territorial attachment and ideological self-placement. A first series of estimations are presented in Table 2.

**Figure 1 : average socio-economic indicators as a function of self-right placement**



The graphs depict the results of a series of ANOVA analyses. Bars represent 95% C.I.

Table 2 reproduces a series of multi-level linear models that estimate self-placement in the left-right scale. The first model suggest that only a modest proportion of the variance of this phenomenon can be attributed to the regions (our second-level unit), and that most of it, therefore, will be a function of individual-level variables. Being more prone to spend more public resources in better services is associated with the left (hence the negative coefficient). But, curiously enough, so is to favor tougher sentences for criminals. Being kin to receive more immigrants is also related to the left, while redistribution overall does not have a neat effect on self-right placement. As

<sup>1</sup> These findings add some nuances to the ones highlighted by Dinas (2012) on the propensity of Basques and Catalans to place themselves more to the left.

for the center-periphery axis, there is a mild effect, significant at the 90% level: individuals feeling more attached to the nation than to the region also place themselves more to the right of the ideological spectrum. Thus, a classical linear model suggests that there are nuanced relations behind a particular position on ideology that such a model cannot fully capture.

**Table 2: multilevel linear estimation of the left-right self placement. (I)**

	<b>Null model</b>	<b>L1 vars.</b>	<b>Random slopes</b>	<b>L2 vars.</b>	<b>L1 + L2 vars.</b>
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Age		.011** (.002)	.011** (.002)		.012** (.002)
Female		-.277** (.053)	-.283** (.055)		-.257** (.057)
Education		.149 (.194)	0,17 (.200)		.211 (.228)
<b>Ideology</b>					
Less taxes/ better services		-.053* (.024)	-.051* (.026)		-.046~ (.025)
Redistribution		.062 (.075)	.061 (.076)		.073 (.081)
Rehab./tougher sentences		-.139** (.022)	-.136** (.022)		-.124** (.021)
More/less immigrants		.085~ (.049)	.082~ (.048)		.112* (.046)
<b>Center-periphery axis</b>					
Territorial attachment		1.108~ (.639)	.989* (.402)		1.121~ (.662)
<b>Regional-level factors</b>					
Gini after taxes				19.872** (5.848)	21.694** (8.111)
GDP/cap(100)				-1.958** (.586)	-1.817** (.665)
Ling.Fragmentation				.001 (.013)	.008 (.013)
Territorial polarization				-.759 (8.504)	-4.364 (8.272)
Ideo. distance from State				.941** (.301)	.700* (.337)
N	32315	28787	28787	30111	26679
N2	11	11	11	10	10
Var-L1	.117	.130	3.328	.051	.056
Var-R	4.265	3.852	3818	4.480	3.901
ICC-L1	.027	.033	.375	.011	.014
-2LL	-64486.4	-55946.6	-55842.219	-61383.2	-52076.2
df	0	8	8	5	9
AIC	128978.8	111913.1	111706.438	122782.3	104172.5
BIC	129003.9	111995.8	111797382	122848.8	104254.4

*Note:* Standard errors in parentheses. Method: Maximum Likelihood. + p<.10 \* p<.05\*\* p<.01. N (first-level number of observations), N2 (second –level number of observations), Var-L1 (variance of the intercept), Var-R (residual variance), -2LL (deviance -2 log likelihood), df (degrees of freedom), AIC (Akaike Information Criterion), BIC (Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion)

In order to know whether territorial attachment has a significant effect at the regions level on the left-right scale, the third column frees the slope of this variable. The variance of the slope is indeed significant, which justifies the forthcoming cross-level interactions in table 3 aimed at explaining their uneven effects on the left-right scale.

The fourth column in Table 2 introduces region-level variables. We observe a diminution in the number of Regions as we lack information for most of the contextual variables for Lucerne. Interestingly, the two variables tapping on economic aspects of the region (the Gini coefficient and the GDP per capita) have significant effects on the left-right scale, and these effects hold when we consider also the individual-level variables (fifth column). More unequal regions beget citizens that tend to place themselves more on the right of the ideological spectrum. Regions richer than their nation spawn citizens that tend to place themselves more on the left of the ideological spectrum. This demeans the argument according to which impoverished regions, or regions unfairly treated by the state –or comparatively poorer than the state- harbor nonconformist feelings that may have turn into anti-authoritarian and ultimately left-leaning positions. None of the distinctiveness variables has a direct effect on the left-right scale but one: the ideological distance from the state. The positive, significant coefficient reads as follows: regions that are placed to the right of their state spawn citizens that tend to place themselves more to the right of the ideological spectrum. Reversely, when the region has an average value on the left-right scale that is to the left of the state, individuals within the region tend to place themselves more to the left of that spectrum.

The models in Table 3 introduce one cross-level interaction at a time, controlling for all the individual-level and region-level variables. The first two models consider a moderation effect of inequality and wealth, respectively, on the relationship between territorial attachment and the left-right scale. The results reject the possibility that the relationship between the national and the left-right axis depend on the economic status of the region.

**Table 3 multilevel linear estimation of the left-right self placement. Cross-level interactions.**

	Terr. attachment# Gini after taxes	Terr. attach. #GDP/cap	Terr. Attach. #Linguistic fragmentation	Terr. attach.# Territorial polarization	Terr. attach.# Ideo. distance from State
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Age	.012** (.002)	.012** (.002)	.012** (.002)	.012** (.002)	.012** (.002)
Female	-.257** (.059)	-.257** (.058)	-.265** (.058)	-.266** (.058)	-.264** (.059)
Education	.212 (.228)	.212 (.229)	.238 (.238)	.238 (.238)	.235 (.237)
<b>Ideology</b>					
Taxes-services	-0.045~ (.025)	-.046~ (.025)	-.045~ (.025)	-.045~ (.025)	-.044~ (.026)
Redistribution	0.072 (.082)	0.072 (0.081)	-.123** (.022)	-.124** (.022)	-.123** (.022)
Rehab./tougher sentences	-.124** (.021)	-0.124*** (0.022)	.112* (.046)	.112* (.046)	.112* (.046)
More/less immigrants	.111* (.045)	0.113* (0.046)	.072 (.082)	.072 (.082)	.072 (.082)
<b>Center-periphery axis</b>					
Territorial attachment	-8.739~ -9,8	2.097 (2.196)	.081 (.789)	-1.245 (1.445)	1.266*** (.254)
<b>Regional-level factors</b>					
Gini after taxes	4,15 (22.44)	21.9** (8.01)	21.8** (8.292)	21.2** (8.214)	21.940** (8.055)
GDP/cap(100)	-1.846* (.616)	-1.348 (1.394)	-1.789** (.673)	-1.776** (.644)	-1.803** (.639)
Ling. Fragmentation	.008 (.012)	.008 (.014)	-.007 (.016)	.006 (.012)	.009 (.012)
Terr.polarization	-4,42 -7,47	-4,55 -8,62	-3.485 (8.356)	-13.460 (8.954)	-3.891 (7.980)
Ideo.distance from State	.696* (.312)	.707* (.346)	.659~ (.340)	.629~ (.323)	1.950** (.548)
<b>Cross-level interaction</b>	33.37 (31.8)	-.894 (2.166)	.030* (.013)	21.158* (9.541)	-2.455** (.798)
N	26679	26679	26679	26679	26679
N2	10	10	10	10	10
Var-L1	.048	.060	.056	.050	.050
Var-R	3895	3.900	3.882	3.885	3.878
ICC-L1	.012	.015	.014	.013	.013
-2LL	-52057.051	-52074.7	-52017.4	-52024.8	-52004.6
df	9	9	9	9	9
AIC	104134.1	104169.5	104054.8	104069.6	104029.3
BIC	104216.019	104251.4	104136.7	104151.6	104111.2


Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Method: Maximum Likelihood. + p<.10 \* p<.05\*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001. N (first-level number of observations), N2 (second-level number of observations), Var-L1 (variance of the intercept), Var-R (residual variance), -2LL (deviance -2 log likelihood), df (degrees of freedom), AIC (Akaike Information Criterion), BIC (Schwarz's Bayesian Information Criterion).

The three next models include interactions between the territorial attachment scale and the three variables tapping on the distinctiveness of the region or, if preferred, measuring the depth of the territorial cleavage or the opposition to the state. In all cases (columns 3 to 5) our expectations are confirmed. Figures 2 to 4 depict the moderation effects



found. Citizens feeling more attached to their nation than to their region in more linguistically differentiated regions are more prone to place themselves to the right of the spectrum. Also, when fragmentation is at its height, individuals more attached to the region place themselves more to the left of the spectrum.

**Figure 2: moderation effects of linguistic fractionalization. 3<sup>rd</sup> model in Table 3**



As for the variable tapping on the polarization of the ethno-regional axis, territorial attachment has an enhanced effect on the left-right scale when the division regarding ethno-regional issues is pronounced. In such scenario, feeling more attached to the nation than to the region has a stronger effect on right-wing self-placements. Conversely, preferences towards the region predict values more to the left of the spectrum.

Figure 3: moderation effects territorial polarization. 4<sup>th</sup> model in Table 3





Figure 4: Figure 3: moderation effects ideological distance with regard the state. 5<sup>th</sup> model in Table 3



Finally, the ideological differences between the region and the state also strengthen the relationship between territorial attachment and self placement in the left-right scale. As negative values identify those regions that are to the left of the national average, we can conclude that in such situations a strong regional attachment predicts values in the left-right scale that are clearly more to the left than when this difference does not exist or goes in the opposite direction (region to the right of the nation).

## **Conclusions**

Much has been written on the left-right scale and its ability to summarize and include new divisive issues and cleavages. This paper has explored the relationship between the left-right axis and the second major structuring divide in public opinion: the center-periphery axis. We have considered the possibility that the latter has an effect on the former, or more explicitly, that under certain circumstances, individuals with a particular position (a stronger territorial attachment to their region than to their nation) will place themselves with a higher probability in a certain position of the left-right scale (more to the left).

We have argued that such causal pattern (territorial identity affecting self-placement in the left-right scale) is plausible because territorial attachment appears earlier in life, is transmitted more successfully within the family than ideological orientations and, hence, structures more specific evaluations and attitudes –such as the ones reflected by self-position in the left-right scale-. Following the existing literature (mostly centered in the discourse and manifestos of ethno-regional parties), we have argued that poorer, more disadvantaged regions will breed more left-wing citizens; and that citizens from more culturally different regions -as compared to their state-will also tend to place themselves more to the left of the ideological spectrum, as a reflect of their rejection for the status quo. We have also explored how these two contextual factors could affect the interplay between territorial attachment

and ideology. In this sense, we posited that territorial attachment will have a stronger effect on ideology (a preferential territorial attachment predicting left-wing positions) for individuals in less wealthy or more distinctive regions.

We run a series of exploratory factor analyses and multilevel models considering 11 different regions in 5 countries to test the effects of contextual characteristics and the interactions between individual and regional variables. The results of factor analyses confirm that, in some regions, there is a covariation pattern between ideology and territorial attachment consistent with a one-dimension scenario or a relation of dependency between both factors. This pattern was particularly clear for Catalonia and Québec, the two regions with a more entrenched territorial conflict with the state among those included in the analyses.

The multilevel estimations confirmed some of our working hypotheses. First, individual-level variables suggest a mild influence of territorial attachment on individual's position in the left-right scale (H1). The models considering contextual factors, however, disconfirmed our second hypothesis: unequal and poorer regions breed citizens that tend to place themselves more to the right of the ideological spectrum. These findings go against arguments that have been thoroughly used in the literature about ethno-regional parties. Our third hypotheses only is mildly supported by one of the indicators of regional distinctiveness: regions that are more right-wing than their state spawn citizens that tend to place themselves more to the right of the ideological spectrum, sort-of reinforcing individuals' attitudes.

Finally, a series of cross-level interactions tested whether the relationship between the center-periphery axis and the ideology scale was stronger under certain circumstances. Non-significant interactions ruled out the possibility that such relationship depends on the level of wealth and equality of the region. Yet the results seem to confirm that such

relationship between regional territorial attachment and ideology is stronger the more culturally different is the region as compared to the state.

This finding talks to the literature on reinforcing cleavages, suggesting that territorial identities aligned with a region in conflict with the state will serve as a heuristic to infer a position in the ideological scale that would be more to the left than if such conflict was less active. Our approach is a rough way to tap the depth and strength of the center-periphery axis, but at least suggests that when a region is very different from its state, allegiances to the region predict left-wing positions. This is a first attempt to explain well-established findings in the literature, such a greater tendency of Catalans and Basques to select positions to the left of the ideological spectrum (Dinas 2012). We have seen that this tendency is independent from their actual policy preferences regarding the welfare state, redistribution, or liberal views regarding the penal system or immigration (see Figure 1). Further research should try to expand the cases included in our analyses in order to gain some more degrees of freedom, tap on country-level variables and reflect about the economic and cultural variables that would best depict the relationship between regions and states; also considering new explanatory factors.

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