

## **The Buffer of Support: Do Young People Resist the Crisis?**

Mónica Ferrín, University of Zürich and Collegio Carlo Alberto

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[Very first draft, comment and suggestions are welcome. Please ask for an update version before citing at [monica.ferrin@uzh.ch](mailto:monica.ferrin@uzh.ch)]

### 1. Introduction

The claim that democracy is in crisis in Europe is not new. Yet, it is crying that the democratic crisis lasts now for several decades, with a strong pick after the 2008/2009 economic crisis. All around, the idea prevails that democracies are no longer able to deliver according to citizens’ expectations. Amongst the most disenchanted with the political regime, the youth are a critical group. Young people are indeed portrayed as the least engaged in politics and the most politically disaffected. The study of the young’s attitudes to democracy in a context of economic crisis becomes therefore crucial: how has the economic crisis affected democratic support of those who are already more disillusioned with politics? Have they been more strongly affected by the crisis as compared to the middle-old and the old-old? This article makes a “rather instrumental use of *the* youth [...]: [...] young people are used as a miner’s canary. It is assumed that if there is any poison in the air of democracy, young people will be the first to detect the danger.” (Hooghe 2004, 334).

By trying to answer this question, this paper aims to contribute to separate strands of the literature. In the first place, there is a dialogue with youth studies. Yet, although most literature on young and politics has focused on political participation as a marker of increasing political disaffection among the youth after the economic crisis (e.g. Sloam 2014), there is less evidence of a systematic decrease in support for democracy among the youth as a consequence of the economic downturn or the lasting “democratic crisis” (Martin 2012, 40). Secondly, this research draws on literature on democratization and generational replacement of democratic support (e.g. Neundorf 2010), by changing the focus to a generation of youth who have been entirely socialized into a democratic context. Within this context, this paper brings in the question on how resistant democratic support is to strong economic crises, specially among the young.

Finally, this paper relies on political learning studies to understand how democratic perceptions are adapted in the light of major information shocks, and by whom.

The paper addresses the main research question by analyzing the impact of the economic crisis on youth's levels of satisfaction with democracy (SWD). The use of this special indicator, very much dependent on economic perceptions, makes it possible to assess the short-term effect of the economic crisis on young and adult support for democracy.

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## 2. Youth and democracy

Youth studies underline age as the main variable that explains why young people engage less (or differently) in politics (Verba and Nie 1987; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). Scholars of the life-cycle approach find that there is a positive association between age and political support; as individuals become gradually more integrated in the political system through participation in the election process, they become more supportive of the political system *per se* (Lockerbie 1993; Topf 1995; Listhaug 1995)<sup>1</sup>. To date, however, most studies have focused almost exclusively on political participation, and much less on democratic attitudes. As a matter of fact, even if age is normally included as a control variable in political support studies, evidence that young people are less satisfied with democracy than the oldest is not systematic. Hence, the first question is whether satisfaction with democracy is dependent on the life-cycle – that is, whether young people are less satisfied with democracy than the old. The second question is whether SWD is more affected by the economic crisis among the young than among the old. To answer these questions I rely on several theoretical frameworks.

The life-cycle approach predicts that political support is a function of age: the older one is, the higher her level of support. However, democratization studies have shown that non/democratic socialization matters much in citizens' attitudes to democracy (Mishler and Rose 2001; Neundorf 2010). In particular, people who have lived under a non-democratic regime tend to find it more problematic to adapt their evaluations of the political system to a democratic

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<sup>1</sup> Alternatively, generational explanations relate low levels of engagement among the youth to the increasing de-alignment of young people that has made them be less supportive with the political system than they were before (Norris 1999; Dalton 2004). Some studies have indeed shown that young people participate increasingly less in electoral politics and are more volatile than older generations (Franklin 2004); and there is also evidence that young people use increasingly more alternative channels of political participation, as compared to the older generations (Sloam 2013; Thijssen et al. 2015). However, there is little empirical support “for the fact that generational change has driven down levels of political trust”, but rather both young and old people seem to have decreased their levels of trust (Martin 2012, 51). Considering the short time-span covered by the data in this paper – as the newest generation corresponds to the youth (and the fluctuant nature of SWD), it is not possible to estimate generational changes in SWD for this period. Still, the graphic representation of the data suggests no generational trend on levels of SWD, but rather similar ups and downs across time for all cohorts.

context. Young Europeans have lived uninterrupted in a democratic regime during their whole lives<sup>2</sup>, socialized into the idea that “democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others”. Young people are therefore expected to be strongly committed to democratic ideals, but maybe are at the same time more critical with the political system (à la Norris 1999), than those whose historical memory still reminds that democracy should not be taken for granted<sup>3</sup>. These two different approaches (life-cycle and democratization) lead to two alternative hypotheses:

H1a: Young people are more satisfied with democracy than old people (because of socialization into democracy)

H1b: Young people are less satisfied with democracy than old people (either because they don't care – life-cycle – or because they care too much – critical citizens)

As for the effect of the economic crisis on SWD, modernization theory predicts that the better off the people are, the more supportive with the political system (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Recent studies have shown that, levels of SWD have dropped dramatically after the economic crisis of 2008/2009 (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014; Armingeon, Guthmann, and Weisstanner 2016; Cordero and Simón 2016; Polavieja 2013). Since SWD does respond so well to economic fluctuations (Ferrín 2016), we would expect that levels of SWD decrease both among the young and the adult population after the economic crisis. The question still is whether the decrease in SWD is higher among the young than among the adult population. Two separate arguments head the second hypothesis.

First and also related to modernization theory, in a context of economic crisis, the youth are a group particularly disadvantaged, as the crisis has come at a point in their lives when they have to enter the labor market, form a family, etc. Considering that one of the main outcomes of the economic crisis has been the high rates of youth unemployment (that imply the impossibility to leave the parents' home and even to have their own family), this group of population has been specially harmed by the economic crisis; even more where the crisis has become persistent. Second, political learning studies predict that young people are more receptive to information shocks, since: 1) they come earlier in life; 2) their system of beliefs is still in the forming and therefore is more labile (Anderson and Just 2012; Delli Carpini 1989; Dinas 2013; Bartels 2001; Bennett 2009). “The marginal effect of a given shock on people's attitudinal profile is probably

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<sup>2</sup> An exception in the data used in this paper are young people from ex-communist countries (people of 32 years old in 2002, when fieldwork started, were 19 years old in 1989). This is one of the reasons why the analysis is done country by country. Further research needs to separate this group of respondents.

<sup>3</sup> For example, people from 40 years old, born around the 1960s, is more likely to endure the memory-effects of WWII.

inversely proportional to the number of prior events that have already occurred during their life trajectory.” (Dinas 2010, X). Considering all this, we would expect that:

H2: Levels of SWD of young people decrease more than those of adult people after 2008/2009, specially in the countries more affected by the economic crisis

### 3. SWD across time and age: data

In order to test these two hypotheses, I rely on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) 2002-2014. This dataset is particularly suited for this purpose for a few reasons. Firstly, the time-span 2002-2014 allows observing the immediate effects (short-term) of the economic crisis on SWD. In addition, we can observe the possible lasting effects a few years later, when most countries have restored economic growth. Secondly, the ESS fieldwork includes individuals from 15 years old, in the midst of the ‘impressionable years’. We can therefore examine levels of SWD among different groups of young. Thirdly, the survey samples 16 European countries, where the impact of the crisis has been very different. And, lastly, the data include the standard question of SWD<sup>4</sup>. Although this indicator has been highly contested (Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2001; Linde and Ekman 2003), it fits well the theoretical framework proposed above precisely due to its imperfections as a measure of democratic support. Levels of SWD react very well to contextual changes, specially to those related to the economic situation. It is a ‘non-stable’ attitude (Sears 1983) that is likely to change from one point in time to the other and both among adult and young people. It is therefore reasonable to assume that a differential change in levels of SWD between young and old people could reflect a differential effect of the economic crisis.

Figures 1 and 2 show levels of SWD by year for each country of the sample. As we can see, levels of satisfaction with democracy have decreased immediately after 2008/2009 in 8 out of the 16 countries represented here, whereas levels remained stable or increased in the other 8 countries. Yet, except for Switzerland, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Slovenia, levels of SWD had already started to decrease in 2008. This probably reflects the fact that data were collected at the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009. The Irish case is particularly telling, as fieldwork was done later than in the other countries (from October 2009 to March


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<sup>4</sup> The ‘satisfaction with democracy’ question is worded as “And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]? 0-Extremely dissatisfied/ 10-Extremely satisfied. Although previous studies tend to use the four-point item of SWD (further recoded into two separate categories: satisfied/ non satisfied), the use of the 11-point scale is preferred here. In a way, the analysis is more demanding with the 11-point scale (also a way of robustness check for previous studies).

2010), which explains the dramatic drop in levels of SWD already in 2008<sup>5</sup>. What is interesting from Figure 1 is that, even if all countries have decreased economic growth after 2008/2009 – except Poland (no drop in SWD after 2008/2009), levels of SWD did not drop equally in all countries. Quite the contrary, citizens in Sweden, Norway and Switzerland have even increased their levels of SWD (although Norway’s decrease in GDP per capita from 2008 to 2010, for example, has been 4.4%, not far away from the countries more affected by the crisis).

Also interesting from Figures 1 and 2– confirming that SWD is highly dependent on the economic context<sup>6</sup> – is that levels of SWD recover immediately in 2012, in most countries, although there is a new decrease in levels of SWD in 2014<sup>7</sup>. Only in Spain, one of the countries where the crisis has impacted most, have levels of SWD continued to decrease after 2010 and until 2014, when the first signs of economic stability start to become visible.

Figure 1 Satisfaction with democracy by country and year




<sup>5</sup> Something similar happens in Hungary, which was fielded from February 2009 to April 2009.

<sup>6</sup> This does not necessarily imply that only the economy is relevant in explaining SWD. Quite the contrary, citizens might perceive that the government elected democratically is not responsive to their demands in a context of economic crisis, which in turn might increase SWD (see Armington et al. 2016 for a similar argument).

<sup>7</sup> Why?

Figure 2 Satisfaction with democracy by country and year



As for our main variable of interest – age – Figures 3 and 4 present levels of SWD across age groups. Over the whole period 2002-2014<sup>8</sup>, and contradicting previous studies, levels of SWD are the highest among the youngest (15 to 25 years old) and the oldest (76+ years old) in almost all 16 countries (the exceptions are Sweden, Norway and Spain). The life-cycle hypothesis seems at first sight disconfirmed. The youngest appear as the most optimistic with the functioning of their democratic systems, even if they have not yet been involved in political participation (this is particularly true for the group from 15 to 17 years old). Quite the contrary, entering adult life and undertaking political engagement seems to be negatively correlated to SWD. This deserves further empirical analysis, which is presented in the next section.

<sup>8</sup> Yet the models control for the year of the survey.

Figure 3 Levels of SWD by age group





Figure 4 Levels of SWD by age group



#### 4. Results

To test the second hypothesis, this section extends previous results with multivariate analyses that include the classic correlates of SWD, both at the individual and the country level. At the individual level, two types of factors are considered: 1) individuals' economic situation and perceptions of their own and of the economic situation of the country (occupation: employed against all the other groups; individual's perceptions of how comfortably he/she lives on present income; and satisfaction with the economy in the country); and 2) individuals' political attitudes and evaluations (levels of political interest, as an indicator of political sophistication; and trust in political parties). Additionally, the estimations control for gender and citizenship status (whether respondent has citizenship status or not), and social trust.

Regarding the main variable of interest, age has been recoded into a dummy variable (*youth*) that distinguishes between young people (15-32 years old)<sup>9</sup> and adults (from 33 years old onwards). This makes it possible to have a clearer picture of the differences between young and adult respondents. In addition, a set of variables is aimed at operationalizing the effects of the economic crisis from different angles. Firstly, the year of the survey is introduced in the estimations as a categorical variable (*essround*), with the expectation in mind that levels of SWD will drop immediately after 2008/2009 (the reference category). Secondly, in order to simplify the estimations, a dummy variable (*post-2008*) is included that distinguishes between pre-2008 years (2002 to 2006) and post-2008 years (2010 to 2014) of the survey, assuming that the treatment (the pick of the economic crisis) takes place in 2008/2009 and that there should be a difference in levels of SWD between the two periods<sup>10</sup>. Third and last, a dummy variable (*crisis*) is included that distinguishes between the countries that have been more strongly hit by the economic crisis and the countries where it has been softer. Since we have argued above that unemployment is the aspect of the crisis that could more likely influence levels of SWD among the youth, this indicator reflects the increase in youth unemployment (15-29 years old, Eurostat) in 2010-2014, as compared to the period 2002-2008. The country-average increase of youth unemployment between the two periods is used as a reference to classify the countries: countries where increase of youth unemployment falls below the mean are coded 0; whereas countries where the increase of youth unemployment falls above the mean are coded 1. In order to observe whether levels of SWD vary more among the youth than among the older after the economic crisis, an interaction term is specified between each of these three variables and youth.

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<sup>9</sup> On the discussion of what is youth

<sup>10</sup> With this variable, round four of the ESS (2008/2009) is dropped from the analysis. Yet since there is a great variation in terms of when the survey was fielded (with the most dramatic case being Ireland, surveyed in 2009-2010), we avoid such bias if it is dropped from the analysis.




As a first step, the estimation is specified for each country separately (and therefore the variable *crisis* is not included at this stage), so that we get a precise picture within each context, with an interaction term between youth and post-2008. As a second step, multilevel model is used to test differences between young and adult people for all countries simultaneously. Figures 5 to 13 present the differences between young and old people for each of the countries conditional on the period of the survey (pre-2008 and post-2008) (see Table 1 in the appendix), whereas Table 1 (and Figures 1 to 4 in the appendix) provide with the results of the multilevel analysis.



Figures 5 to 13 and Table 1 in the appendix indicate that by 2014 almost all countries had recovered from the drop in democratic satisfaction that ensued immediately after the economic crisis. Yet, the situation differs across countries, specially in what regards the gap between levels of satisfaction with democracy of young and old people. We can distinguish between four types of situations, plus a single country: 1) countries where there are no differences in levels of SWD between young and old pre/post-crisis (Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Ireland<sup>11</sup>, Netherlands, and Poland); 2) countries where both young and old people increased levels of SWD post-2008, but young's levels of SWD increased less than those of old people (Switzerland, Great Britain, and Sweden); 3) countries where both young and old people decreased levels of SWD, but young's people decrease is bigger than that of old people (Spain, Slovenia); 4) countries where old people increased levels of SWD post-2008, whereas young people decreased levels of SWD (Finland, France, Hungary, and Portugal); and 5) Norway, where young people increased more levels of SWD as compared to old people. In a nutshell, even in countries where the economic crisis has not been so strong – and with a few exceptions, while previous to the economic crisis young people tended to be more satisfied with democracy than the old people, the pattern has reversed post-2008: either there are no longer differences in levels of SWD between young and old people or young people are more dissatisfied than old people.



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
<sup>11</sup> Maybe should consider previous year as the reference, considering that fieldwork for 2008 was done entirely during the crisis.

Figures 5 to 13 Marginal effects of youth on SWD conditional on pre/post-2008 (adult in blue; young in red)









This is further confirmed by the multilevel analysis, as shown in Table 1. Young people’s levels of SWD are differently affected by the economic crisis than are adult’s levels, specially in the countries more strongly hit in terms of unemployment.

Table 1 Multilevel results, with all countries

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Gender (men)	-0.0996*** (0.00856)	-0.0998*** (0.00856)	-0.0982*** (0.00928)	-0.0978*** (0.00928)	-0.0969*** (0.00927)
Citizen of country	-0.396*** (0.0216)	-0.396*** (0.0216)	-0.389*** (0.0236)	-0.392*** (0.0236)	-0.389*** (0.0236)
Occupation: Unemployed	-0.120*** (0.0190)	-0.119*** (0.0190)	-0.0966*** (0.0203)	-0.0948*** (0.0203)	-0.102*** (0.0203)
Occupation: Disabled	-0.130*** (0.0265)	-0.130*** (0.0265)	-0.116*** (0.0287)	-0.116*** (0.0287)	-0.110*** (0.0287)
Occupation: Retired	-0.0602*** (0.0107)	-0.0603*** (0.0107)	-0.0528*** (0.0116)	-0.0519*** (0.0116)	-0.0522*** (0.0116)
Occupation: Housework	-0.0162 (0.0157)	-0.0157 (0.0157)	-0.00150 (0.0170)	-0.00440 (0.0170)	-0.00214 (0.0170)
Living comfortably on income (-)	-0.116*** (0.00586)	-0.116*** (0.00586)	-0.108*** (0.00634)	-0.108*** (0.00634)	-0.109*** (0.00634)
Social trust	0.0710*** (0.00199)	0.0710*** (0.00199)	0.0712*** (0.00216)	0.0713*** (0.00215)	0.0706*** (0.00215)
Political interest	0.0700*** (0.00500)	0.0698*** (0.00500)	0.0693*** (0.00541)	0.0704*** (0.00541)	0.0706*** (0.00541)
Trust in politicians	0.333*** (0.00218)	0.333*** (0.00218)	0.334*** (0.00236)	0.333*** (0.00236)	0.333*** (0.00236)
Satisfaction with the economy	0.317*** (0.00214)	0.317*** (0.00214)	0.318*** (0.00230)	0.318*** (0.00230)	0.324*** (0.00235)
Autocracy	-0.278* (0.148)	-0.278* (0.148)	-0.288** (0.142)	-0.296** (0.142)	-0.281** (0.141)
Youth	0.0776*** (0.0108)	0.119*** (0.0270)	0.113*** (0.0160)	0.152*** (0.0143)	0.162*** (0.0197)
Essround=2002	-0.162*** (0.0155)	-0.160*** (0.0174)			
Essround=2004	-0.205*** (0.0155)	-0.202*** (0.0175)			
Essround=2006	-0.233*** (0.0153)	-0.242*** (0.0171)			
Essround=2010	-0.115*** (0.0152)	-0.119*** (0.0170)			
Essround=2012	0.242*** (0.0150)	0.272*** (0.0168)			
Essround=2014	-0.222*** (0.0153)	-0.212*** (0.0170)			
Youth#essround2002		-0.00745 (0.0376)			
Youth#essround2004		-0.0150 (0.0377)			
Youth#essround2006		0.0448 (0.0376)			
Youth#essround2010		0.0178 (0.0375)			
Youth#essround2012		-0.151*** (0.0373)			
Youth#essround2014		-0.0539 (0.0382)			

Table 1 (continued) Multilevel results, with all countries

Post-2008			0.187***	0.171***	0.0861***
			(0.0101)	(0.00898)	(0.0128)
Youth#post-2008			-0.0703***		-0.0249
			(0.0220)		(0.0275)
Crisis				0.121	-0.0149
				(0.145)	(0.145)
Youth#crisis				-0.205***	-0.144***
				(0.0230)	(0.0325)
Crisis#post-2008					0.264***
					(0.0211)
Youth#post-2008#crisis					-0.103**
					(0.0459)
Constant	2.902***	2.895***	2.782***	2.749***	2.759***
	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.100)	(0.111)	(0.110)
Observations	195,076	195,076	166,131	166,131	166,131
Number of groups	16	16	16	16	16

## 5. Conclusions

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## Appendix

VARIABLES	BE	CH	DE	DK	ES	FI	FR	GB
Gender (men)	-0.0213 (0.0357)	-0.168*** (0.0357)	-0.0312 (0.0317)	-0.146*** (0.0371)	-0.0376 (0.0433)	-0.159*** (0.0281)	-0.0837* (0.0478)	-0.144*** (0.0357)
Citizen of country	-0.486*** (0.0736)	-0.148*** (0.0506)	-0.619*** (0.0713)	-0.0645 (0.113)	-0.539*** (0.0874)	-0.373*** (0.115)	-0.573*** (0.120)	-0.563*** (0.0888)
Occupation: Unemployed	0.0984 (0.0771)	-0.219* (0.115)	-0.0946 (0.0718)	-0.314*** (0.0949)	-0.0672 (0.0722)	-0.0782 (0.0641)	-0.105 (0.0968)	-0.193** (0.0853)
Occupation: Disabled	-0.0748 (0.0941)	-0.127 (0.132)	-0.0192 (0.119)	0.147 (0.148)	0.0342 (0.138)	-0.609*** (0.131)	0.00846 (0.155)	-0.329*** (0.0906)
Occupation: Retired	0.0792* (0.0471)	-0.0491 (0.0461)	-0.0854** (0.0386)	-0.148*** (0.0480)	-0.0197 (0.0606)	-0.306*** (0.0335)	-0.0469 (0.0586)	0.0174 (0.0438)
Occupation: Housework	-0.123* (0.0627)	-0.0494 (0.0560)	0.0976* (0.0523)	0.0959 (0.0878)	0.0879 (0.0649)	-0.0412 (0.0837)	-0.177* (0.108)	-0.205*** (0.0682)
Living comfortably on income (-)	0.0105 (0.0227)	-0.127*** (0.0242)	-0.229*** (0.0223)	-0.0892*** (0.0305)	-0.0522** (0.0261)	-0.134*** (0.0221)	-0.275*** (0.0345)	-0.130*** (0.0234)
Social trust	0.0501*** (0.00841)	0.0490*** (0.00825)	0.0702*** (0.00703)	0.107*** (0.00994)	0.0598*** (0.00979)	0.0947*** (0.00807)	0.0468*** (0.0114)	0.0660*** (0.00859)
Political interest	0.143*** (0.0203)	0.164*** (0.0212)	0.0694*** (0.0191)	0.137*** (0.0246)	-0.0659*** (0.0230)	0.105*** (0.0184)	0.172*** (0.0263)	0.0861*** (0.0196)
Trust in politicians	0.324*** (0.00920)	0.289*** (0.00913)	0.393*** (0.00782)	0.316*** (0.0100)	0.279*** (0.00984)	0.333*** (0.00774)	0.326*** (0.0128)	0.370*** (0.00886)
Satisfaction with the economy	0.317*** (0.00987)	0.274*** (0.00917)	0.296*** (0.00768)	0.240*** (0.00980)	0.300*** (0.0109)	0.313*** (0.00841)	0.378*** (0.0135)	0.330*** (0.00923)
Youth	0.272*** (0.0590)	0.175*** (0.0576)	0.0834 (0.0559)	0.0729 (0.0684)	-0.223*** (0.0693)	0.220*** (0.0484)	0.410*** (0.112)	-0.0198 (0.0614)
Post-2008	0.0865** (0.0396)	0.186*** (0.0396)	-0.322*** (0.0370)	0.278*** (0.0432)	-0.323*** (0.0526)	0.147*** (0.0321)	0.271*** (0.0597)	0.630*** (0.0403)
Youth#post-2008	0.00158 (0.0804)	-0.0138 (0.0829)	0.0635 (0.0743)	-0.00388 (0.0910)	-0.101 (0.0947)	-0.286*** (0.0676)	-0.271** (0.130)	-0.181** (0.0854)
Constant	2.249*** (0.126)	3.376*** (0.117)	3.401*** (0.115)	3.013*** (0.174)	3.877*** (0.146)	2.810*** (0.153)	2.578*** (0.181)	2.302*** (0.132)
Observations	10,261	9,778	16,867	8,422	10,108	11,550	7,431	12,121
R-squared	0.332	0.283	0.355	0.284	0.309	0.404	0.320	0.365

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

VARIABLES	HU	IE	NL	NO	PL	PT	SE	SI
Gender (men)	-0.0365 (0.0398)	-0.221*** (0.0409)	-0.121*** (0.0296)	0.0158 (0.0337)	-0.0701* (0.0404)	-0.108*** (0.0398)	-0.149*** (0.0338)	-0.120*** (0.0417)
Citizen of country	0.0405 (0.459)	-0.353*** (0.0806)	-0.383*** (0.0934)	-0.246*** (0.0761)	0.0340 (0.818)	-0.516*** (0.119)	-0.272*** (0.0976)	-0.628** (0.254)
Occupation: Unemployed	0.0658 (0.0928)	-0.202*** (0.0731)	0.108 (0.0830)	-0.170* (0.103)	-0.0448 (0.0771)	-0.00116 (0.0708)	-0.192** (0.0859)	0.0576 (0.0889)
Occupation: Disabled	0.151 (0.114)	-0.318*** (0.123)	-0.168** (0.0694)	0.105 (0.0916)	0.206 (0.202)	-0.212 (0.161)	-0.427*** (0.0927)	0.526*** (0.191)
Occupation: Retired	0.0329 (0.0480)	0.0142 (0.0576)	0.0143 (0.0402)	0.0334 (0.0471)	0.0219 (0.0505)	-0.0320 (0.0487)	-0.209*** (0.0444)	0.00304 (0.0516)
Occupation: Housework	0.115 (0.0768)	-0.116** (0.0565)	-0.126*** (0.0421)	-0.162** (0.0745)	0.0223 (0.0773)	0.135** (0.0690)	0.0202 (0.129)	-0.0726 (0.0818)
Living comfortably on income (-)	-0.0483* (0.0262)	-0.154*** (0.0249)	-0.101*** (0.0202)	-0.0457* (0.0250)	-0.217*** (0.0321)	-0.111*** (0.0260)	0.00850 (0.0250)	-0.0782*** (0.0283)
Social trust	0.0714*** (0.00857)	0.0675*** (0.00821)	0.0713*** (0.00754)	0.0971*** (0.00937)	0.0837*** (0.00849)	0.0633*** (0.00848)	0.0626*** (0.00858)	0.0776*** (0.00866)
Political interest	0.0608*** (0.0231)	0.0117 (0.0206)	0.111*** (0.0182)	0.0325 (0.0223)	0.123*** (0.0249)	0.135*** (0.0219)	0.0375* (0.0214)	0.0134 (0.0244)
Trust in politicians	0.283*** (0.00970)	0.297*** (0.00898)	0.361*** (0.00833)	0.322*** (0.00901)	0.280*** (0.0105)	0.232*** (0.0108)	0.368*** (0.00912)	0.362*** (0.0108)
Satisfaction with the economy	0.494*** (0.0107)	0.291*** (0.00906)	0.230*** (0.00870)	0.272*** (0.00875)	0.427*** (0.00997)	0.383*** (0.0110)	0.311*** (0.00930)	0.398*** (0.0109)
Youth	0.244*** (0.0689)	-0.0423 (0.0674)	0.0331 (0.0504)	-0.0551 (0.0554)	0.0446 (0.0606)	0.0440 (0.0649)	0.291*** (0.0563)	0.146** (0.0674)
Post-2008	0.200*** (0.0446)	0.606*** (0.0491)	0.199*** (0.0309)	0.172*** (0.0392)	0.259*** (0.0471)	0.130*** (0.0430)	0.349*** (0.0384)	-0.133*** (0.0505)
Youth#post-2008	-0.208** (0.0938)	0.0230 (0.0873)	0.0368 (0.0713)	0.237*** (0.0789)	0.0257 (0.0844)	-0.135 (0.0934)	-0.212*** (0.0807)	-0.163* (0.0952)
Constant	1.174**	3.052***	2.757***	2.728***	1.878**	2.542***	2.638***	2.000***

	(0.474)	(0.133)	(0.129)	(0.134)	(0.827)	(0.155)	(0.141)	(0.277)
Observations	8,852	12,156	11,118	9,931	9,748	10,307	10,206	7,275
R-squared	0.439	0.278	0.351	0.322	0.355	0.262	0.374	0.463

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Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Figure 1 – Aggregate sample




Figure 2 – Aggregate sample




Figure 3 – Aggregate sample




Figure 4- Aggregate sample

