Revisiting the protest voting hypothesis:
An empirical analysis on six EU countries

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Introduction

While in general political science the definition and characteristics of a protest behavior have been deeply focused over time, in the branch of electoral studies we cannot unfortunately say the same. So far the effectiveness of an electoral protest has been generally inferred by specific dynamics at the macro level, such as electoral earthquakes and shocks in the morphology of the existing party systems. This was true, for example, in the first 2000s, when a substantive growth of *radical right parties* in Europe was interpreted by some as the expression of increasing political alienation and unease within specific sectors of society (e.g. Kriesi *et al.* 2006). The same applies to the recent rise of *new* and/or *eurosceptic parties*, described by some as the outcome of citizens' reaction to the bad performances of their political systems and elìtes under the economic crisis (e.g. Treib 2014; Kriesi and Hernandez 2016). Yet sudden increases in the electoral outcomes of these parties are not necessarily related to an underlying intention to *protest*. Indeed, one could well contribute to their success because (s)he likes their policy platform or because feels ideologically and/or psychologically closed to them. However, this would scarcely fit to protest voting as it is usually intended in the literature, i.e. casting a vote with the main aim to frighten or punish the whole political system and/or an èlite (see van der Eijk 1996). Several scholars have tried to deal with this topic in the past. Nevertheless, their analyses have been mainly aimed at assessing whether voting for a specific party - or type of party - was characterized by a protest motivation or not (e.g. van der Brug *et al.* 2000; Erlingsson and Persson 2011; Passarelli and Tuorto 2016). Thus, a more comprehensive and cross-country test of the electoral consequences of protest voting still lacks in empirical research. This is exactly what the present contribution is intended to deal with. Specifically, I will focus on the electoral conjucture of the European elections of 2014, trying to understand to what extent the electoral fortunes of the so-called *anti-establishment parties* are effectively due to protest motivations at the individual level. To do that, I will focus my analysis on

some Western European countries characterized by a recent rise of this kind of parties: Greece, Italy, Spain, France, United Kingdom and the Netherlands (see also Hartleb 2015)**.**

The remaining of this presentation is structured as follows. In the first paragraph I will briefly introduce the concept of *protest voting*, by presenting its basic definitions, operationalization and current evidences in the existing literature. In the second paragraph I will discuss and partially rework its conceptualization, so to present my research objectives and hypotheses punctually. Afterwards, I will introduce my analytical strategy, and finally I will present my results. Some concluding remarks and consideration about future research will follow.

1. Key literature on the topic

The first step towards a test of the electoral consequences of protest voting is to understand what protest voting is actually intended to be. A first possibility could be to look at the nature of the voted party (Svensson 1996). Nevertheless, stating that a protest voter is a voter who votes for a protest party seems at least tautological. Moreover, it completely overlooks voters' reasons for supporting a party rather than another.[1] In the light of this criticality, Van der Brug *et al*. (2000) conceptualized protest voters as those voters who cast their vote in order to show *discontent* to their political system or elìte by voting for a party that is an *outsider* in the political arena. This aspect is particularly crucial. Indeed, what they suppose to mainly drive voters' party choice is an underlying willingness to *frighten* or *shock* the whole political elite (see also: Van der Eijk *et al.* 1996).

How to measure protest voting then? In truth, different solutions have been attempted in the last decades, both at the individual and at the contextual level (e.g. Holsteyn and Mudde 1998; Swyngedouw 2001). However, the main reference to the approach pursued in this paper is the Tillie's typology of party preference. This stems from the two of the main determinants of party preference: ideology and party size (Tillie 1995a: 118). The combination of these two variables according to their *preponderance* in the determination of party preference defines the distinction among the types of voters reported in Table 1.

[Table 1 about here]

Within this framework, protest voters, if compared to *idealist* and *pragmatic voters*, appear as those who do not maximize their party utility neither in terms of policy/ideological proximity nor in terms party size. In other words, they are neither *idealist* nor *pragmatist*. This is because they are

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1 That is the case of Palle Svensson (1996:294-306). In his analysis of Danish politics in the 1970s he categorized all relevant parties as *loyal*, *semi-loyal*, or *disloyal* in relation to the political system, then defining the voters of the last two types as *protest voters*.

supposed to cast a vote for a party apart from any strategic consideration in traditional terms, as they have the only aim to scare the political elite. In empirical terms, this should be signaled by weak effects of both ideological proximity and policy preferences, as well as party strength, on party utility.

Van der Brug *et al.* (2000) tried to test such expectation on radical right (anti-immigrant) parties. However, they had to conclude that votes for these parties could not be considered as protest votes, as they appeared to be motivated by the same ideological and pragmatic considerations characterizing support to all other parties.

Such a conclusion provoked the reactions of several scholars. Pippa Norris, for example, although being in agreement with the work of Van der Brug *et al*., criticized it for failing *'to consider any direct evidence for or against protest voting, such as indicators of political disaffection, trust and alienation among radical right supporters'* (2005:151).[2] A systematic effort in this direction has been realized for example by Bergh (2004). Indeed, by following those studies that distinguished among different levels of political trust (e.g. Easton 1965; Gamson 1968; Norris 1999a), he argued that, for the purposes of empirical research on protest voting, one should distinguish between two levels only (*institutional trust* and *trust in political elites*). Basing on this assumption he found that, net of several policy and ideological orientations, there is a significant effect of indicators of *elite distrust* on voting for a political party. However, these conclusions only apply to the three case on which his empirical study is focused: Austria, Denmark and Norway.

More recent contributions have also emphasized the idea that policy and ideological considerations are not mutually exclusive *vis-a-vìs* direct measures of protest voting in determining the decision to cast a protest vote (e.g. Hosch-Dayican 2011). Nevertheless, this point has to be more robustly assessed in the future in order to avoid hasty conclusions.

2. Disentangling protest voting: towards a research hypothesis

Despite all the integrations and amendments to the original model, protest voting still remains a partially unresolved issue. Indeed, the current literature does not completely agree in recognizing its empirical effectiveness. Conceivably, this is due to the multiplicity of approaches and analytical strategies used to assess it so far. At present, different authors have indeed relied on different sets of indicators, often focusing only on single parties or party types, in turn assumed to mobilize protest voting (e.g. Erlingsson and Persson 2011; Passarelli and Tuorto 2016). Both these strategies have

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2 Her empirical remedy consisted in presenting a (weak) negative relationship between voting for a radical right party and institutional trust, as well as a negative correlation between satisfaction with government and voting for a radical right party, arguing they could be a sign of protest voting. Nevertheless, according to some her analysis presents some problems (see van der Brug and Fennema 2007: 481).

surely not favored the coherence and comparability of findings over time. In the light of that, I will assess the electoral consequences of protest voting according to a *two-step* analytical strategy, in which I will firstly specify some assumptions about its attitudinal bases and then I will introduce some considerations about their possible electoral consequences.

As regards the first element, the operational definition proposed by van der Brug *et al.* (2000) seems to be the most appropriate starting point. Indeed, since it is relies on standard predictors of party preference, it looks particularly fit for the analysis of multiparty contexts. As already mentioned, it defines a protest voter as a voter whose vote choice is primarily driven by his state of political displeasure towards the political system and/or the elite. Nevertheless, the two authors do not focus too much on the nature of such state of displeasure. With the aim to improve some previous attempts to provide protest voting with a series of direct attitudinal indicators (e.g. Bergh 2004), I suppose this one to be powered by two underlying components. The first should have to do with a sense of perceived *policy failure*, i.e. the perception of parties' inability to deal effectively with problems regarded by citizens as important. The attitudinal cluster at the base of this assessment is usually called *political discontent* and its main indicators concern people's dissatisfaction about day-to-day actions of political leaders and parties (e.g. Anderson, Blais, Botowler, Donovan and Listhaug 2007; Curini, Jou and Memoli 2012). The second should regard, on the contrary, a perception of a *systemic failure*, which relates to a more general feeling of estrangement from politics, due to a perceived lack of transparency and fairness of institutional processes and outputs (e.g. Dahlberg and Holmberg 2013). The attitudinal domain at the base of this assessment is in this case *political disaffection* (e.g. di Palma 1970; Montero and Torcal 2006) and is usually measured by indicators as institutional distrust and external political inefficacy. These two components could be expected to jointly affect party preferences in the case of protest voting. On the other hand, political attitudes such as ideology and policy positions should be of minor importance (see also Luebbers and Scheepers 2000). Someone may well ask why these characteristics should be considered as a sign of protest voting. To understand this point, just consider that the basic vocabulary of any political competition is made of ideologies, issues and positional strategies concerning them. Within this framework, choosing a party by a main reference to policy and system performance considerations represents an unconventional criterion of choice, easily associable to an underlying motivation to express discomfort with (and thus to protest against) how politics currently works. Here it is where the issue of the electoral outcomes comes into play. Indeed, a necessary requirement for an electoral protest to be effective should be that the chosen party represents a meaningful protest option. In this respect, I will test the standard assumption that, in the context of the EP Elections of 2014, *anti-political-establishment* parties (see Schedler 1996), i.e.

niche parties with an anti-political-estalishment 'tone' (see also: Meguid 2005, 2008; Wagner 2011a) were the main recipients of protest voting at the individual level. Summarizing what argued so far, the present empirical work will be oriented to test the following hypothesis:

Anti-Establishment Party Vote Share Hypothesis: the more policy and system performance evaluations emerge as the primary factors explaining party preferences, while ideological and issue considerations lose their explanatory importance, the higher the electoral success of *anti-establishment* parties.

3. Design of the study

3.1 Data

As the aim of this study is to assess the electoral consequences of protest voting for *anti-establishment* parties in some European countries, the following analyses will rely on the most recent post-electoral study at the European level: the 2014 EES Voter Study.[3] Such study consists of a EU-wide survey which was to be carried jointly with the post-electoral survey commissioned by the European Parliament (EP). Therefore, it presents the clear advantage of gathering information about electoral behavior in all the EU countries in a single dataset. As my intention is not to focus on European elections, but rather on voting calculus in general, someone could object that a European Election Study might not be the right instrument to do that, as it assesses electoral attractiveness of the main national parties at the time too close to that of the European election. In truth, this has never been much of a problem. Rather, the European Election Studies are not only fielded to study the behavior of voters in elections to the European Parliament, but also to study the behavior of European voters (see van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; van der Eijk, Franklin and Marsh 1996). Moreover, they favor a comparative approach by over-sampling interesting national context (Marsh 2002).[4]

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3 Schmitt, Hermann; Hobolt, Sara B.; Popa, Sebastian A.; Teperoglou, Eftichia; European Parliament, Directorate-General for Communication, Public Monitoring Unit (2015): European Parliament Election Study 2014, Voter Study, First Post-Election Survey. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5160 Data file Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12384

4 The sample is not a simple random sample of European voters but a disproportionate stratified random sample, with about 1.100 respondents from each EU country, with the exceptions of Malta and Luxembourg, where the sample size is about 500. Given the huge variation in country size between United Kingdom at one extreme and Luxembourg at the other, this is very disproportionate. However, such strategy provides the necessary database for identifying national differences in voting behavior. *"A sample of the same size designed simply to maximize inference to the European electorate would have far too few individuals to assess the extent to which voters in Ireland, or Denmark, or Sweden fitted the European model as well as those in France, The Netherlands or Finland"* (Marsh 2002, 12).

3.2 Analytical strategy

The expectations of this research imply specific choices in terms of analytical and operationalization strategy. In a quite conventional research framework, a first reasonable solution to analyze the electoral effects of some indicators of protest voting would be to characterize vote choice in a dichotomous way, contrasting those voters who chose a party sufficiently different from its established competitors to all the others. Nevertheless, such solution would not fit to the aim of keeping protest voting as analytically independent from any party level characterization. As a matter of fact, the use of any dichotomous dependent variables based on characteristics of the voted party is likely to be misleading, as party classifications always tend to focus on a single or few features characterizing individual political parties, while also external, not specified features could be of actual importance (e.g. van der Eijk, van der Brug, Kroh and Franklin 2006). On the contrary, basing on the *electoral attractiveness* of each relevant party seems to be a more suitable solution. This characteristic can be measured for all parties irrespective of their party family and political system and is usually assessed by the following question: *'Please tell me for each of the following how probable it is that you will ever vote for this party in general election?'*. After that, respondents are asked for their probability to vote for each of the most relevant parties in their political system in a score ranging from 1 (no likelihood of supporting the party) to 10 (strong likelihood). The use of electoral attractiveness requires that the data matrix is stacked as showed in Figure 1 (e.g. Stimson 1985; Tillie 1995a; Oppenhuis 1995; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). In this stacked matrix each respondent is represented by as many 'cases' as there are parties for which (s)he was asked to indicate the probability of a future vote. Nevertheless, its structure allows to examine the impact of these latter on the first one just employing familiar and straightforward methods of analysis, such as regression. The dependent variable is the preference score for each political party in turn, while appropriate identifiers allow characteristics of individual respondents and parties to be added as independent variables. What we get by doing so is the possibility to estimate the global effect of a series of variables on individual party preferences for any relevant party of one's political system.

[Figure 1 about here]

Within this framework, how to operationalize protest voters? According to the scheme proposed by van der Brug *et al.* (2000), these voters should reasonably appear as people who scarcely fit to the predicted values of a standard voting function, i.e. observations which deviate so much from the other observations as to arouse suspicions that they were generated by a different mechanism

(Hawkins 1980). A scarce - or even null – effect of traditional predictors of party preferences, in fact, should be reflected in the magnitude of the residuals of a regression analysis estimating the only effects of standard strategic considerations preceding vote choice, such as ideological proximity to parties, party identification and individual positions on a series of policy issues. Nevertheless, relying on the pure residuals of a standard voting function would not be sufficient in order to assess the electoral consequences of protest voting. Indeed, it would not yield any information about the nature of the voted party. Moreover, what constitutes a sufficient deviation for a point to be considered a potential protest vote would be a too much subjective judgement. In real applications, the data may be embedded in a significant amount of noise, and such noise may not be of any interest to the analyst (Aggarwal 2013). Due to these criticalities, my empirical strategy will consist in exploring the data in an alternative way, i.e. by observing consequences in the predicted values of a voting model due to manipulating the size of its regression coefficients into different counterfactual scenarios (e.g. van der Eijk 2007). This procedure will consist of several steps. Firstly, I will estimate a series of base models explaining voters' party preferences in the six countries under analysis. These are standard multiple regressions to be estimated separately for each country in a stacked dataset. Second, I will use the estimated regression coefficients derived from step 1 to calculate voters' expected preferences in different scenarios, in which the effects of strategic and attitudinal predictors are manipulated so to increasingly resemble a purely protest decision-making. Third, these predicted preferences will be transformed into counterfactual individual votes, by selecting as party choice the highest individual party preference. Afterwards, these votes will be aggregated into counterfactual vote shares.[5]

How to identify *anti-establishment* parties within this context? In principle, they could be assessed according to different dimensions of differentiation in respect to their mainstream competitors: an *office-seeking dimension*, defining them as parties having or not a significant chance of participating in government, i.e. *challenger parties* (e.g. Hobolt and de Vries 2012); a *discursive* and *policy-seeking dimension*, according to which they are parties that focus on issues away from the mainstream dimension of party competition (Meguid 2005, 2008; Wagner 2011a); and finally an *organizational dimension*, particularly focusing on new and small parties. Indeed, both novelty and smallness have an anti-establishment appeal, as they both denote *innocence* (Schedler 1996; Sikk 2012). For reasons of simplicity, here I refer only to the discursive dimension. In particular, I define as *anti-establishment* parties those parties that made use of an intensive *anti-elite* tone, according to

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5 As well explained by van der Eijk (2007), the necessary condition for that procedure to work is that voters tendentially choose to vote for the party that they prefer most. However, this has been proven to be an empirical regularity since the 1990s (e.g. van der Eijk and Franklin 1996, Chapter 20).

the most recent Chapel Hill expert survey.[6] Basically, on a scale running from 0 to 10 on which parties have been positioned according to their emphasis on anti-elite rhetoric in 2014, I selected as *anti-establishment* only those parties with a mean score at the top end of the scale (i.e. higher than 7). Clearly, this selection criterion can be further refined and improved in the future. Nevertheless, it seems to be discriminating enough for the purposes of this first empirical test. A list of the resulting *anti-establishment* parties is reported in Appendix. Only those ones for which PTVs were measured in the context of the 2014 EES Voter Study have been effectively considered in the analysis.

That said, let me now introduce the independent variables in the equation to predict parties' electoral attractiveness, and how these are treated in the stacked matrix. The first is party identification, i.e. a measure of psychological closeness to a party built by using two variables of the original dataset, the first one indicating whether the respondent has a party identification or not, and the second one measuring the strength of this feeling. The final variable I employ is a combination of these two, which assumes value 0 when the subject is not identified with the stacked party and goes up until the value of 3 for increasing levels of identification.

A second predictor is ideological proximity to a party, i.e. the subjectively perceived distance between a voter and the respective party in the data matrix on a left-right *continuum*. The questionnaire contains a battery of items in which respondents were asked to indicate their own position as well as that of each political party on a 10-point scale of which the extremes were labeled left and right. From these responses perceived left-right distances have been computed as the difference between one's own self-placement and the position attributed to each party. The stronger the effect of perceived left-right proximity on electoral attractiveness, the stronger the extent of *ideological voting*.

Thirdly, we have policy considerations. In this regard, I will consider seven of the issues provided by the 2014 EES Voter Study: EU integration, state of the economy, redistribution of resources, services *vs.* taxes, same-sex marriages, immigration and environment. All these are measured with batteries of statements to which respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed. Because of this lack of information about perceived party positions, I will use an alternative procedure in order to estimate the contribution of these attitudes to party preference. For all these attitude scales separately, and for each of the parties in turn, in fact, series of bivariate regressions will be performed. The resulting predicted values of these regressions (*y-hats*) will be then saved and inserted in the stacked data matrix. As these values are simply linear transformations of the original

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6 Ryan Bakker, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Vachudova. 2015. *"2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey"*. Version 2015.1. Available on chesdata.eu. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

variable, they may therefore be used again as a proxy-measure of closeness to a party, so to assess how well each attitude predicts preferences for each of the parties.[7]

The same procedure will be applied in order to operationalize the two attitudinal dimensions I assumed at the base of protest voting, i.e. attitudes towards the performance of ruling parties and towards the political system as a whole. As regards the first, I will make use of government (dis)approval, a dichotomous variable assuming value 1 when the respondent disapproves the current government's record. Concerning the second, instead, I will refer to general attitudes towards the political system, represented by two indicators of external political (in)efficacy and by a variable measuring public confidence in national parliaments. Specifically, to estimate the effect of these variables on party preference, I will compute their predicted values by running two separate regressions, one for the item of the first attitudinal dimension (government disapproval), and one for the three items of detachment from the political system at once. In this way, it will be possible to explore the extent to which the assumed attitudinal clusters at the base of protest voting predict preferences for each relevant party in the countries under analysis.

3. Analysis

Do protest motivations at the individual level effectively favor the electoral success of the so-called *anti-establishment* parties? As mentioned earlier, to answer that question, I performed several estimations of predicted vote choice by manipulating the regression coefficients of individual level models predicting party preferences (PTVs) in each of the six national sub-samples under analysis. Six baseline models have been actually performed in order to estimate the electoral consequences of different counterfactual scenarios. In Table 2 I report the baseline model of Greece. This is displayed by way of example, since all the six baseline models look rather similar. What immediately catches the eye is that, once controlling for several predictors notoriously affecting party preference, the variables summarizing perceptions of political system performance and policy performance of the ruling parties significantly affect voters' party preferences, regardless of the nature of the voted party. At first glance, this could look not very promising, if compared to my expectations about the electoral success of *anti-establishment* parties. Nevertheless, this finding simply tells us that in 2014 considerations towards policy and political system performance were not specific of any of the parties in competition. To say it in other terms, all national voters, to some extent, had these elements in their minds while sorting their party preferences. Yet protest voting is something even more specific. Indeed, it is assumed to be moreover characterized by a relatively

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7 The actual variable which is added to the stacked matrix is not the y-hat, but the deviation of the y-hats from their mean for each party. For an elaborate discussion of this procedure, see Van der Eijk and Franklin (1996, chapter 20).

low explanatory importance of ideological and issue considerations. Both these sides of the operational definition of protest voting should be taken into account while creating counterfactual scenarios.

[Table 2 about here]

In this regard, what I actually do is manipulating the regression coefficients of baseline models like the one above so to make them progressively resemble our idealtype of protest voter. Precisely, this is accomplished by three successive steps, in which beta coefficients concerning attitudes towards party and political system performance are progressively doubled, while those regarding strategic (ideological or issue) are divided by two at each time.[8] Ultimately, this means that the three resulting counterfactuals consist in increasing impacts of presumed protest motivations on individual party preferences. Table 3 represents the output of this procedure, consisting in the predicted electoral outcomes of the *anti-establishment* parties included in the 2014 EES Voter Study under the baseline condition (first row) and under each counterfactual condition (second to forth row).[9]

Even giving just a quick look at the data, it seems that the expectations of my *Anti-Establishment Party Vote Share Hypothesis* are, at least partially, met. Indeed, there are different cases of *anti-establishment* parties widely increasing their vote shares for increasing impacts of protest attitudes on party preference. One of the most evident is certainly the National Front in France, which almost triples its vote share once moving from the baseline condition to the third counterfactual. Similar cases are also the Party of Freedom in the Netherlands and Podemos in Spain. This latter, in particular, seems to hugely benefit from the presence of a protest voting calculus in the general electorate. Indeed, its vote percentage shifts from 29,10% under the baseline condition up almost to the brink of absolute majority within the third counterfactual (47,16%). Not all findings, however, are convincing as such. Weaker evidences regard for example Greece. Here most of the parties classified as *anti-establishment* take advantage of increasing impacts of protest motivations on party preferences only in a limited way. An exception to this trend is the Greek Communist Party, which substantially doubles his vote percentage along the four scenarios. On the other hand, Syriza and

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8 As suggested by van der Eijk (2007), I do not use actual vote shares of parties as baseline models, as this would negatively affect comparisons between reality and counterfactual situations. Indeed, estimated models always embed a certain amount of error that is not present in actual values. Referring thus to predicted values under real situations allows us to include the same amount of error in both estimates, ensuring that the resulting differences in electoral outcomes are extensively due to coefficient manipulation.

9 The predicted electoral outcomes of all other relevant parties are are not displayed here since they are not the focus of the present analysis. All the estimated data are however available upon request to the author.

Golden Dawn gain only slightly more than 2,5% in their vote shares within the same sequence, while the Independent Greeks lose almost all their electoral consensus. The situation in the UK looks rather similar. The electoral gains of UKIP, in fact, are surprisingly low (only + 1,54% in vote shares between the baseline model and the third counterfactual). Moreover, both the Greens and the Scottish National Party halve their electoral outcomes. In Italy, on the other hand, the electoral results of *anti-establishment* parties seem to meet the expectations of my *Anti-Establishment Vote Share Hypothesis* to a relatively higher extent. In fact, while the Northern League seems not to be favored by protest voting at the individual level (its vote share remains substantially unchanged under the varying counterfactuals), the Five Star Movement clearly enhances its election outcomes along the four scenarios. The percentage difference in vote shares between the baseline model and the last counterfactual is not particularly high (+6,88%) but however clear and unfolding in the expected direction.

[Table 3 about here]

Ultimately, what we can deduce from these findings is that, generally, protest voting at the individual level implies meaningful electoral consequences. Indeed, in the majority of our cases, at increasing effects of protest motivations on party preferences, we assist to substantive electoral gains by *anti-establishment* parties in a series of counterfactual models. Clearly, as shown above, there are some exceptions to this tendency. Nevertheless, they seem to raise more doubts about the nature of their electoral success than about the general validation of my *Anti-Establishment Vote Share Hypothesis*. Indeed, it could well be that those deviant parties are more characterized by issue and/or ideological voting than by purely protest arguments. If confirmed, this would imply that, in some cases, the common sense expectation that the electoral fortunes of these parties are primarily due to protest motivations is somehow overstated. Further explorations in space and time will confirm or deny this possibility.

Concluding remarks

As argued at the beginning of this contribution, the common assumption that the electoral success of *anti-establishment* parties is related to protest - rather than ideological - considerations has received very fragmented empirical insights over time. Within this framework, I tried to reassemble and to rework the analytical pieces of this still underdeveloped field of research. Basically, what I did was to integrate its original focus on the analysis of party preferences for specific parties or party types to the observation of electoral outputs at the macro-level and in comparative

perspective. As shown above, the first results of this approach look rather promising. Indeed, according to my first analyses protest voting - as described by certain literature on voting behavior - seems to actually exist and to receive a meaningful translation in terms of *anti-establishment* electoral outcomes. Clearly, this is not enough for the creation of a unified and comprehensive framework on this topic. First of all, the robustness of these findings should be checked by extending the analysis to other European countries and compared with the electoral results of alternative party types. This will allow us to observe whether a regular protest voting pattern arise. Moreover, a consideration of the possible triggering factors, especially on the political supply side, should be seriously considered. In particular, the question about what makes one party, rather than another, a credible conveyer of an electoral protest still has to find clear answers. Further research on this topic should further explore how contextual elements such as party propaganda or political/party system features affect the translation of protest considerations into specific patterns of electoral outcomes.

TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Types of Party Preference Based on Ideology And Power as Independent Variables

		Power (party size)	
		Weak influence	Strong positive influence
Policy agreement (left/right and/or issues)	Weak influence	(Potential) protest votes	Pragmatic/clientelist votes
	Strong influence	Idealist votes	Pragmatic/idealist votes

From van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie (2000)

Figure 1: Structure of A Stacked Data Matrix

From van der Eijk, van der Brug, Kroh and Franklin (2006)

Table 2: Factors Explaining Party Preferences in Greece (OLS Regression)

VARIABLES	PTV
PARTY IDENTIFICATION	2.404***
	(0.0557)
L-R PROXIMITY TO PARTY	0.353***
	(0.0146)
EU INTEGRATION	0.107
	(0.118)
IMMIGRATION	0.202**
	(0.102)
ENVIRONMENT	0.221
	(0.160)
SAME SEX MARRIAGE	0.249***
	(0.0813)
REDISTRIBUTION	0.169**
	(0.0768)
SERVICES VS. TAXES	0.614**
	(0.302)
MARKET REGULATION	0.207
	(0.242)
SYSTEMIC PERFORMANCE	0.233***
	(0.0519)
GOV. PERFORMANCE	0.147***
	(0.0485)
Constant	-0.179*
	(0.103)
Observations	5,060
R-squared	0.470

Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

N.B. The six baseline models also include a 'SSEV' variable, a predictor taking into account socio-structural effects on party preferences. These ones include: gender, age, age ending full time education, living area (rural/urban), religiosity, church attendance, work status, subjective social class and union membership. Since it is used as a control variable, its coefficient is not reported in the regression output. The model in its entirety is however available upon request to the author.

Table 3: Anti-Establishment Parties Vote Shares Under Different Counterfactual Conditions Concerning The Effect of Protest Motivations On Party Preferences (%)

Scenario	FRANCE		ITALY		NETHERLANDS	SPAIN
	National Front	Left Front	Northern League	5 Star Movement	Party of Freedom	Podemos
Baseline model	13,99	6,91	6,72	21,83	8,26	29,10
Counterfactual 1	19,69	6,74	6,72	22,01	14,13	39,26
Counterfactual 2	29,88	3,28	6,72	24,25	23,71	43,98
Counterfactual 3	37,65	0,52	7,13	28,71	28,86	47,16
	N = 3762		N = 3642		N = 6044	N = 3126

Scenario	GREECE				UNITED KINGDOM		
	Communist Party	Independent Greeks	Syriza	Golden Dawn	Greens	Scottish National Party	UKIP
Baseline model	7,50	4,85	32,21	9,12	11,04	2,61	21,93
Counterfactual 1	7,94	5,00	35	10	6,90	1,99	23,31
Counterfactual 2	9,56	2,94	37,35	13,09	5,06	1,53	23,62
Counterfactual 3	14,71	1,62	35	11,62	4,75	1,38	23,47
	N = 5060				N = 2886		

APPENDIX

List of Anti-Establishment Parties in The Six Countries in 2014

COUNTRY	Party Label	Party Name (Original)	Party Name (English)
FRANCE	FN	Front National	National Front
	PG	Front the Gauche	Left Front
	Ens	Ensamble	Together
	MPF	Mouvement Pour la France	Movement for France
UK	UKIP	UK IndependenceParty	UK IndependenceParty
	SNP	Scottish National Party	Scottish National Party
	Green	Green Party	Green Party
GREECE	AE	Anexartitoi Ellines	Independent Greeks
	KKE	Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas	Communist Party of Greece
	SYRIZA	Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás	Coalition for The Radical Left
	LAOS	Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós	Popular OrthodoxRally
	CA	Chrysí Avgí	Golden Dawn
ITALY	LN	Lega Nord	North League
	M5S	Movimento 5 Stelle	Five Star Movement
NETHERLANDS	PVV	Partij voor de Vrijheid	Party for Freedom
SPAIN	PODEMOS	Podemos	We Can

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 2014

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